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leads to complexity; and that evolution and learning are 
conceptually linked.
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[C]hange is taking place on many scales at the same 
time, and ... it is the interaction among phenomena 
on different scales that must occupy our attention.  
—Simon A. Levin (1992).
1 Introduction
There have been two main ways of thinking about the 
nature of mutation and how it allows for adaptive evolution. 
One has been neo-Darwinism. According to it, mutation 
happens by accident, and natural selection acts as a sieve 
(though this view started with the mutationists, it lasted to 
the post-synthesis era; Morgan 1903; Fisher 1930; Dawk-
ins 1986; Beatty 2016). This view not only assumes that 
mutation is accidental, but often assumes that selection acts 
on additive (separate) genetic effects, so that it could favor 
the beneficial mutations and weed out the deleterious ones 
(Ewens 2004,  p. 39; Wade and Goodnight 1998; Provine 
1971, p. 165; Provine 1986, p. 241). To this, Sewall Wright 
added that genetic interactions are also of fundamental 
importance (Wright 1931, 1932). However, he offered ran-
dom genetic drift, not a selection-based force, as the cause 
of the formation of beneficial genetic interactions (Wright 
1931, 1932; Provine 1986). These concepts have left tra-
ditional evolutionary theory with two important ways of 
relying on chance: one through accidental mutation and the 
other through random genetic drift (Kimura 1985).
Abstract How does new genetic information arise? Tra-
ditional thinking holds that mutation happens by accident 
and then spreads in the population by either natural selec-
tion or random genetic drift. There have been at least two 
fundamental conceptual problems with imagining an alter-
native. First, it seemed that the only alternative is a muta-
tion that responds “smartly” to the immediate environment; 
but in complex multicellulars, it is hard to imagine how 
this could be implemented. Second, if there were mecha-
nisms of mutation that “knew” what genetic changes would 
be favored in a given environment, this would have only 
begged the question of how they acquired that particular 
knowledge to begin with. This paper offers an alternative 
that avoids these problems. It holds that mutational mecha-
nisms act on information that is in the genome, based on 
considerations of simplicity, parsimony, elegance, etc. 
(which are different than fitness considerations). This sim-
plification process, under the performance pressure exerted 
by selection, not only leads to the improvement of adap-
tations but also creates elements that have the capacity to 
serve in new contexts they were not originally selected for. 
Novelty, then, arises at the system level from emergent 
interactions between such elements. Thus, mechanistically 
driven mutation neither requires Lamarckian transmis-
sion nor closes the door on novelty, because the changes it 
implements interact with one another globally in surpris-
ing and beneficial ways. Finally, I argue, for example, that 
genes used together are fused together; that simplification 
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A substantial addition to the above has been the rise of 
evo-devo and the related view of evolvability (e.g., Wagner 
and Altenberg 1996; Hallgrímsson et  al. 2005; Müller 
2007b, 2008; Brakefield 2006; Hendrikse et al. 2007; Wag-
ner 2014; Laland et  al. 2015).1 An overarching argument 
here is that it is not the accidental mutation per se, but its 
phenotypic consequences, that are subject to selection, and 
therefore evolution cannot be understood without under-
standing the developmental process and the genotype-phe-
notype map, which translate mutation and environmental 
influence into phenotypic change (Hallgrímsson et al. 2005; 
Hendrikse et al. 2007). Furthermore, the genotype-pheno-
type map itself is evolving, and it has been proposed that, 
from genetic variation, it can generate phenotypic variation 
that is particularly useful for adaptive evolution (West-
Eberhard 2003; Kirschner and Gerhart 2006; Gerhart and 
Kirschner 2007; Laland et al. 2015).
A different kind of argument, but one that has also 
been connected to the term “evolvability” (Sterelny 2007; 
Koonin 2011), is that mechanisms of mutation themselves 
can evolve under accidental mutation and natural selection 
(Kimura 1967; Leigh 1970; Ram and Hadany 2014). As a 
quintessential example, the presumed SOS system in bacte-
ria (Radman 1975) has been interpreted from this direction 
(e.g., Radman 1999; Caporale 2003; Koonin 2011), imply-
ing that bacteria have evolved under repetitive periods of 
stress to increase their general mutation rate in response 
to starvation (see Roth et  al. 2003; Rosenberg 2001 for 
reviews and criticisms). Importantly, though, this line of 
thinking still keeps accidental mutation at the core of the 
adaptive evolutionary process, first because it relies on 
accidental mutation and natural selection for the evolution 
of such mutational mechanisms in the first place, and sec-
ond because it considers such mechanisms to be additions 
to the process of accidental mutation and natural selec-
tion, a process which still requires accidental mutation at 
its core (for example, it is presumed that by encouraging 
many accidental mutations, the bacterial response above-
mentioned speeds up the search for solutions; e.g., Radman 
1999; Caporale 2003; Koonin 2011). Thus, evolvability 
sensu mutational mechanisms is an addition rather than an 
alternative to the idea of accidental mutation and natural 
selection as a sieve.
Coming back to the most basic level of analysis, the 
other main line of thinking about how adaptive evolution 
works has been Lamarckism. According to it, the organism 
can respond through beneficial heritable change to the 
immediate environment that it senses. This idea relates to 
modern notions of “directed” or “adaptive” mutation (Luria 
1 This sense of evolvability is distinct from that of Valiant (2009), to 
be discussed in Sect. 5.7.
and Delbrück 1943; Cairns et al. 1988; Hall 1988; Sarkar 
1991; Keller 1992; Koonin 2011) as well as notions of 
Lamarckism through epigenetic inheritance (e.g., Jablonka 
and Lamb 2005). However, one problem with Lamarckism 
is that we do not believe, for example, that a hawk could 
not only sense that it needs sharper vision but also transmit 
this knowledge down to the level of its genes and then 
change them in a way that will lead to sharper vision in its 
offspring at the end of their highly complex course of 
development. In other words, in multicellulars, Lamarck-
ism represents the unappealing reversal of the apparently 
one-way function from genotype to phenotype that is devel-
opment (Koonin 2011) and therefore cannot serve as a gen-
eral-level explanation for evolution.2
Now, there has been a tacit assumption that the two 
alternatives mentioned above at the most basic level of 
analysis are the only two alternatives: that either mutation 
is accidental at the core, or it is Lamarckian, responding 
in some “smart” way to the immediate environment. One 
may even ask how there could possibly be an alternative: it 
seems that either there are mutational mechanisms that are 
“aware” of the external environment and of genetic changes 
that would be favorable, or there are not, and then nothing 
remains to be done but essentially “try changes at random” 
(or at most add minor modifications such as mentioned 
above, e.g., adjusting the rate of trying changes at random).
The purpose of this paper is to propose a third alterna-
tive. In this third alternative, selection in the sense of dif-
ferential survival and reproduction is still the force that 
provides feedback on the fit between the organism and its 
environment. However, mutation is neither Lamarckian nor 
accidental. Instead, mutational mechanisms act on informa-
tion that is in the genome as though by considerations of 
simplicity, parsimony, elegance, etc. (which are different 
than fitness considerations). This broadly construed sim-
plification, I argue, operates under the performance pres-
sure exerted by selection—things can only be simplified as 
long as they keep working—and this simplification under 
performance pressure is partly responsible for the power of 
evolution.
Furthermore, I argue that the elements that result from 
the process of simplification under performance pres-
sure not only perform better but have the capacity to come 
together in new, useful interactions. In other words, they 
2 At most it can be used in addition to accidental mutation and natu-
ral selection, but that does not bring us closer to a parsimonious and 
general-level explanation for the remaining mysteries of evolution. 
Already in 1926, Berg commented on the lack of parsimony in using 
both a selection-based mechanism and an independent, Lamarckian-




have the capacity to serve in new contexts they have not 
been originally selected for. This provides an inherent 
explanation for cooption in evolution different from treat-
ing cooption, like mutation, as a mere accident (Williams 
1966).
In this paper, I will discuss various observations in 
support of this idea, from gene translocation and fusion 
(Sect. 2), gene conversion and deletion (Sect. 5.4), and the 
general notions of error correction and pattern completion 
(Sect. 5.6) on the molecular level, to the evolution of innate-
ness (Sect. 4), the evolution of stereotypy and ritualization 
(Sects. 4.8, 4.10), the convergence on an adaptation from 
a fuzzy and disorganized state to a sharp and clockwork-
like state (Sects. 4.12, 4.13), and more on the organismal 
level. While some of these topics have been the thorn in the 
side of evolutionary theory since Darwin, here they will be 
explained from a unifying framework. Why simplification 
under performance pressure works I will argue by analogy 
to other creative processes. In model building, in machine 
learning, and in the very development of science, we know 
that it is not sufficient for the model or hypothesis to per-
form—i.e., fit the facts. To prevent over-fitting, the model 
must also be elegant (Wigner 1960; Hamming 1980). It is a 
grand fact of nature that the more elegant model, hypothe-
sis, or scientific theory is more likely not only to hold when 
new information comes to bear on the problem, but also to 
produce useful predictions that were not necessarily con-
ceived of in advance (Wigner 1960; Hamming 1980). Like-
wise, I will argue that simplification under performance 
pressure in biology creates elements that both work well 
and have the inherent capacity to be coopted (Sects. 3.4, 
4.5, 4.8, 4.13, 4.15, 5.7, and throughout).
Crucially, notice that the proposed process of simplifi-
cation under performance pressure does not lead to ever 
more simplicity and diminution; on the contrary: It is a 
well-known fact that duplication of genetic material occurs 
in various forms and allows the amount of genetic mate-
rial and genetic information to increase (Ohno 1970; Jacob 
1977; Lynch 2007), and simplification operations must be 
understood within this context. The duplication of elements 
simplified under performance pressure allows them to serve 
in new contexts without coming at the expense of the previ-
ous function they fulfilled, leading to an increase in com-
plexity. Thus, I argue that, surprisingly, simplification is 
connected to complexity: under performance pressure, and 
together with gene duplication upon its various forms, local 
simplification leads to a global increase in complexity.
Notice that, in this proposal, while mutation is not 
“aware” of the immediate environment and is not Lamarck-
ian, it is non-accidental in a manner not considered before. 
In fact, it is essential to consider the joint action of this 
mutation and natural selection.3 That is, according to the 
view proposed here, adaptive evolution is the outcome of 
two substantial forces that operate together, almost against 
each other: the pressure of performance and the pressure of 
simplification.
Notice that this proposed view is substantially different 
from previous literature. First, although there is no question 
that evolvability sensu the genotype-phenotype map is of 
fundamental importance,4 it is at first approximation 
orthogonal to this paper, because this paper is concerned 
with the antecedent, genetic causes of mutation and how 
these causes relate to organismal-level evolution.5 Second, 
although this paper will share with evolvability sensu muta-
tional mechanisms the basic recognition that there are 
evolved influences on mutation, all of its main ideas, 
including simplification under performance pressure, are 
distinctly different from those of past literature. Third, 
although this paper will argue that the causes of the muta-
tions relevant for adaptive evolution under selection are not 
accidental, as mentioned, it will not invoke Lamarckism.
In addition, this paper will closely connect to past litera-
ture on the evolution of novelty (e.g., Müller 1990; Müller 
and Wagner 1991; Schlichting and Pigliucci 1998; West-
Eberhard 2003; Müller and Newman 2005; Moczek 2008; 
Wagner and Lynch 2010; Hallgrímsson et  al. 2012; Hall 
and Kerney 2012; Brigandt and Love 2012; Peterson and 
Müller 2013; Wagner 2014). First, it will agree with that 
literature on the fact that network-level (or system-level) 
evolution is responsible for the evolution of novelty at both 
the phenotypic (Müller and Wagner 1991; Hallgrímsson 
et al. 2005; Müller 2007a; Moczek 2008; Schlosser 2015) 
and genetic (Wagner and Lynch 2010; Lynch et  al. 2011; 
Emera and Wagner 2012; Lynch et  al. 2015) scales and 
on multiple fundamental points that follow from this (see 
Sect. 4.16). Second, it will also contribute to that literature 
in several ways: While past literature on novelty focused on 
the evolution of morphology, here I will provide comple-
mentary examples from the evolution of behavior. In addi-
tion, while past literature recognized the centrality of coop-
tion for novelty (Gould and Vrba 1982; Hallgrímsson et al. 
3 Note that here I mean “natural selection” in the sense of differential 
survival and reproduction, not in the sense of the traditionally pro-
posed process consisting of accidental mutation and selection as a 
sieve.
4 It has been part and parcel of the rise of evo-devo, a field unfortu-
nately neglected at the time of the modern synthesis (Müller 2007a).
5 Many organismal-level observations will be provided in this paper 
and their role is to support the fact that, also at the organismal scale, 
evolution is based on network-level evolution and simplification 
under performance pressure. These in turn connect with non-acciden-
tal mutation in fundamental ways, as will be explained in Sect. 5.2.
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2012; Müller 1990; Müller and Wagner 1991; Schlichting 
and Pigliucci 1998; West-Eberhard 2003; Müller and New-
man 2005; Moczek 2008; Peterson and Müller 2013) and 
the existence of biological phenomena that facilitate coop-
tion, like gene duplication (Müller 2007a; Hall and Kerney 
2012) or “weak regulatory linkage” (Kirschner and Gerhart 
2006), it has not considered the possibility that the nature 
of the evolutionary process (the part of it studied prior to 
the rise of evo-devo) is fundamentally different than that of 
accidental mutation and selection as a sieve, and that this 
difference brings out an underlying reason for cooptability, 
as will be considered here.
This paper is a sequel to a previous paper introducing 
interaction-based evolution (Livnat 2013), and is a part of 
that theory. While Livnat (2013) developed the concept of 
non-accidental mutation by drawing connections between 
the facts of sexual recombination, the empirical nature of 
mutation, and more (summarized in Sect. 5.1), the present 
paper provides a way of understanding the big picture of 
how natural selection and non-accidental mutation work 
together. It relies on non-accidental mutation to drive 
simplification.
The paper will be structured as follows. The next section 
will offer a network-based view of evolutionary change. 
Section  3 will introduce the idea of simplification under 
performance pressure. Together, these two sections will 
propose how non-accidental mutations can be useful for 
evolution yet not be Lamarckian. Building on these new 
concepts, Sect. 3 will offer new insights on the emergence 
of novelty in evolution. Section 4 will bring a large number 
of empirical observations in support of the view proposed 
here, focusing on such phenomena as the evolution of 
innateness, stereotypy, and ritualization. Insodoing, it will 
argue that automatization is at the essence of the evolution-
ary process. Of particular importance will be Sect.  4.13, 
where all the concepts developed up to that point will come 
together in one empirical example with an emphasis on the 
evolution of novelty—that of the evolution of egg retrieval 
by backward walking in birds. Finally, Sect. 5 will revisit 
the molecular level in light of the concepts developed, dis-
cuss the nature of mutational mechanisms and draw a con-
nection between evolution and learning, including machine 
learning, underscoring the importance of the algorithmic 
lens (Papadimitriou 2007; Karp 2011) for our understand-
ing of evolution.
2  A Contextual View of Genetics
A single example of non-accidental mutation will help 
to fix ideas. Consider the genes encoding cyclophilin A 
(CypA) and TRIM5. CypA is a highly abundant cytosolic 
protein (Haendler and Hofer 1990) that, among its various 
activities, potently binds several retroviral capsids, includ-
ing HIV-1 (Kaessmann et  al. 2009). TRIM5 is a restric-
tion factor that recognizes and inactivates incoming retro-
viral capsids (Virgen et  al. 2008). Interestingly, a copy of 
the CypA gene has retroposed into the TRIM5 gene inde-
pendently in at least two different simian lineages (Virgen 
et al. 2008; Nisole et al. 2004; Sayah et al. 2004; Liao et al. 
2007; Brennan et  al. 2008; Wilson et  al. 2008; Newman 
et al. 2008), and the resulting TRIM5-CypA fusion protein 
appears to provide strong protection against certain lentivi-
ruses (Nisole et al. 2004; Sayah et al. 2004). Not only have 
these two genes fused at least twice, there are many other 
TRIM genes, and tests of artificial fusions of the CypA 
domain to some TRIM motifs have shown that they too can 
provide retrovirus protection (Zhang et al. 2006; Yap et al. 
2006, 2007), yet TRIM5 specifically repeats in both fusions 
mentioned above (Virgen et al. 2008).
Here I argue that this gene fusion has not been acciden-
tal, but has been the result of mutational mechanisms (see 
also Livnat and Papadimitriou 2016a). In particular, I argue 
the following. Genes that are used together are more likely 
to be transcribed at the same time and even in the same 
place in the nucleus (e.g., in transcription factories, which 
bring remote loci together; Jackson et  al. 1993; Edelman 
and Fraser 2012; Papantonis and Cook 2013). Furthermore, 
since genetic information indicating that they work together 
(like shared cis elements and transcription factors that bind 
to them) is present in the DNA and accessible in the ger-
mline, they can be transcribed together in the germline due 
to the latter’s transcriptional promiscuity (Kleene 2005; 
Livnat 2013) even if they work together specifically in the 
soma. Hence the two loci can be brought close together 
and be open at the same time in the germline. This will 
make them incomparably more likely than other genes to 
be fused together by reverse transcription, which we know 
to occur in the germline (Brosius and Tiedge 1996; Bro-
sius 1999), or by other mechanisms (e.g., recombination-
based ones). Furthermore, and interestingly, the fact that 
there is transcriptional promiscuity in the germline allows 
many somatic as well as germline genes to participate in 
such operations. In general, therefore, I argue that copies of 
genes that are used together repeatedly and persistently in a 
certain context are more likely to be genetically fused; or in 
short: genes that are used together are fused together (see 
also Livnat and Papadimitriou 2016a).
When considering translocation and cooption it has com-
monly been assumed that sequences just jump one day by 
chance from one locus to another, and, on rare occasions, 
fortuitously acquire a new use there. Indeed, because genes 
are either fused or not, it may even appear at first sight as 
though molecular cooption could not be an outcome of a 
gradual evolutionary process, fitting with the view of muta-
tion as an unexpected, stochastic event. However, I argue 
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here that gene usage and genetic change are mechanisti-
cally connected, and that, more specifically, gene fusion 
is preceded by gene action: First, a gradual evolutionary 
process leads a pair of genes to interact tightly in a certain 
context. Then, their fusion does not require a unique acci-
dental event of low probability but rather is facilitated by 
the genetic mechanisms mentioned above. In fact, the same 
fusion can then happen in different individuals indepen-
dently, which helps to explain both recurrent gene fusion in 
genetic disease (Li et al. 2008; Osborne 2014) and parallel 
gene fusion in evolution (for a related discussion, see Car-
valho et al. 2010; Livnat 2013). It even raises the intrigu-
ing theoretical possibility of a sharp evolutionary transition 
within a species from a pre- to a post-fusion state without a 
selective advantage.
Are genetic evolutionary mechanisms such as the mech-
anistic gene fusion above important for our understanding 
of the essence of the evolutionary process, though? One 
way to demonstrate their potential importance is through 
the connection between the above mechanistic gene fusion 
and Hebbian learning (Stephen Pacala, personal communi-
cations). According to Hebbian learning, when one neuron 
participates in firing another neuron repeatedly and persis-
tently, the strength of the synapse between these two neu-
rons is increased (Hebb 1949). Thus, it has been said that 
neurons that fire together wire together (Löwel and Singer 
1992). Hebbian learning is important because it is one of 
perhaps many operations of network change that allow the 
brain to learn in the context of continual input from the out-
side. In the above, we have a genetic evolutionary operation 
that is Hebbian learning–like (Livnat and Papadimitriou 
2016a): genes used together are fused together. Much like 
local operations of network change are believed to be 
essential for learning in the context of continual input, this 
connection opens our eyes to the possibility that mecha-
nisms of genetic change, in the context of natural selection, 
are fundamental to evolution.6
Importantly, notice that, like Hebbian learning, the 
genetic fusion mechanism above exemplifies simplification: 
genes that used to be regulated by two separate lines of 
regulation are now regulated as one (see more in Sect. 2.2). 
In addition, we see here an example of the evolution of 
innateness at the molecular level: what was previously 
a phenotype—an interaction between two genes (Livnat 
and Papadimitriou 2016a)—is now a ready-made gene. 
6 As will be discussed in Sect.  5.7, a connection between Hebbian 
learning and evolution was recently proposed via phenotypic integra-
tion (Watson and Szathmáry 2016; Watson et al. 2016). In contrast, 
here it is proposed that a Hebbian learning–like mechanism is imple-
mented by mutation itself.
Simplification and innateness are two main themes that will 
be discussed in this paper.
2.1  Cooption at the Phenotypic Level is Due 
to a Gradual Process
Let us now consider an example from the organismal level, 
which shows that simplification, cooption and innateness 
occur there as well. This will be the example of the inciting 
ceremony in ducks (Lorenz 1941/1971, 1958, 1966). In the 
European common shelduck (Tadorna tadorna), when the 
female is standing near her mate, her aggression instinct is 
triggered by the presence of neighbors, and she may run 
toward them with her neck stretched, which is the threat 
posture in ducks (Lorenz 1966). As she approaches them 
she naturally becomes fearful, turns around and flees back 
toward her drake.7 Approaching her drake, the former 
instinct is triggered again. In those cases where her breast 
is still facing him, she turns her neck back to threaten the 
neighbors over her shoulder. This behavior by the female 
can incite her mate to attack the neighbors. Note that the 
angle between the neck and the body of the female is 
entirely dependent here on the situation—her body orienta-
tion is due to the location of the drake and her neck orienta-
tion is due to the location of the neighbors (Lorenz 1966).
Lorenz followed the homologues of this behavior in 
other duck species and suggested that the to-and-fro move-
ment such as seen in the common shelduck has gradually 
become ritualized, so that, in the ritualized forms, the 
female does not perform the to-and-fro but stands near her 
drake; and, most interestingly, the two elements of orient-
ing the body toward the male and stretching the neck over 
the shoulder toward the neighbors—which in the non-ritu-
alized forms are triggered separately by the environment—
have become fused together (Lorenz 1941/1971, 1958, 
1966). For example, in the East European-Asiatic ruddy 
sheldrake (Tadorna ferruginea), the neck and body orienta-
tions are still controlled separately, but in most of the cases 
the female stands with her breast to the drake and her neck 
pointing backwards (and very rarely this behavior may be 
performed without a neighbor present) (Lorenz 1966). And 
in the mallard (Anas platyrhynchos), the same breast-to-
the-male-and-pointing-backwards is observed, but now this 
posture is compulsory and, at high excitation, which acti-
vates the instinct (the same relationship between excitation 
and activation of instinct exists for many other instincts), 
the female is compelled to turn her neck over her shoul-
der even if that means that the neck moves away from the 
7 This to-and-fro movement is not surprising, as it is very common in 
territorial disputes across species of birds, fish and mammals.
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neighbor (Lorenz 1958). Thus, two elements of behavior, 
previously triggered separately by two separate environ-
mental triggers, have become fused together and triggered 
as one. Finally, in the golden-eye (Bucephala), where the 
movement is highly ritualized (see below), the presence of 
a conspecific is not even required (Lorenz 1966).
Interestingly, along with the evolutionary change of 
form of the behavior, there has been also an evolutionary 
change of meaning. In the species with the less-ritualized 
form, the behavior has the effect of inciting and is related to 
territorial behavior. However, note that it already has in it 
an element of pair-bonding, or team work. In the more ritu-
alized cases, this pair-bonding meaning has moved to the 
fore: in the mallard, though it sometimes still elicits a dem-
onstration of attack by the male, inciting serves mostly as 
an invitation to pair-bond; and in the golden-eye, the incit-
ing has become almost entirely independent of the presence 
of neighbors, and takes a highly ritualized, exaggerated and 
rhythmic form of neck movements over one shoulder and 
then over the other (and rhythmic movement is indicative 
of highly ritualized behaviors in general).
It is due to the highly surprising nature of this example 
and others that Lorenz has been accused of Lamarckian 
thinking. However, many examples of this sort exist, and 
I will argue that they are explained not by Lamarckism but 
by network-level evolution (Sects. 2.2, 4).
What is important to notice in the two examples dis-
cussed so far is as follows. In both of them, we see a 
gradual process arising from preexisting interactions. A 
novel phenotype (the fused protein in one case, the ritual-
ized display in the other) arises from the change in context 
in which preexisting elements (preexisting genes, move-
ments) are embedded. In fact, what was once an interaction 
has now become an object: in the case of TRIM5-CypA, a 
hypothesized interaction between two separate genes is suc-
ceeded by a gene fusion; and in the evolution of the inciting 
ceremony, two separate behavioral responses to two sepa-
rate environmental triggers (orienting the body toward the 
drake and threatening the neighbors over the shoulder) has 
now become fused into a new instinct. These cases show 
that the source of novelty can be in system-level changes. 
In both cases, novelty arises not from a point-wise change, 
not suddenly and not without relation to preexisting herit-
able information.
Among other things, we also see local simplification 
in both cases: in simians, what previously required the 
separate transcription of two genes now requires the tran-
scription of one, and in ducks, a roundabout to-and-fro 
behavior has now turned into a stationary clear display. 
These aspects and more will be explored in-depth in this 
paper with the use of various examples and by developing 
concepts.
2.2  Network Evolution and Its Operators
I will now propose a verbal model that ties shifts in con-
text to network-level evolution. The model is purposely 
described at a high level because its role is to elucidate con-
cepts, not to provide mechanistic detail.
Consider that in the course of genetic evolution, the net-
work of genetic interactions gradually changes as a whole. 
Many changes take place across the genome and across 
time, and these changes interact. This process involves reg-
ulatory changes that can rewire the genetic network (Carroll 
2005), such as movements of transposable elements carry-
ing with them cryptic enhancer/promoter sites and multiple 
mutations activating those sites (Lynch et al. 2011). Even a 
regulatory change that at first sight appears only to change 
the strength of an existing connection between two nodes—
e.g., to increase the effect of a regulator on its target—can 
effectively cause rewiring, because there is no sharp bound-
ary between the case where the regulator has a negligible 
effect on its target (in which case the two nodes can be said 
to be effectively disconnected) and the case where it has a 
non-negligible effect (where the two nodes can be consid-
ered to be connected).
Rewiring means that, in the course of evolution, the con-
nections between some nodes in the network become 
tighter and the connections between other nodes become 
weaker, and recognizing it is important. When the connec-
tions between nodes become tighter, they come to be regu-
lated more and more as one unit, and a new module arises. 
What in the beginning may have been two separate ele-
ments regulated by two separate lines of control can gradu-
ally come under one line of control. As will be understood 
later, this change represents the arrival of a new automatic 
unit. Furthermore, when this coming together of genes is 
preceded by the duplication of those genes and their regula-
tory elements, this new module does not arise at the 
expense of previous ones, but represents a total increase in 
the number of modules; and together with this increase in 
the number of modules comes an increase in the extent of 
higher-level interactions between modules (since all the 
modules must ultimately come together into one organism, 
and now there are more of them8).
8 “Number” of modules and “more” modules could be put in quo-
tations because modules do not have a precise number, as they ulti-
mately grade into each other, indeed because they have to be con-
nected to each other. The definition of a module used in the literature 
is a fuzzy one and rightly so: it is a set of genes that interact more 
closely with each other than with other genes, even though to interact 
with the “outside,” at least some of its members have to have just as 
strong a connection to members outside of the module. However, the 
fact that we cannot perfectly count the total number of modules is an 




While the term “module” usually refers to a set of tightly 
interacting genes, a rather basic module or unit is an exon; 
and because exons in separate loci may interact through 
trans-splicing, or through protein-protein interactions, etc., 
the same kind of process of tightening and weakening con-
nections between nodes can cause the coming together of 
two previously interacting exons into a gene, or gene 
fusion. Such a fusion may be long in the making. This 
shows us a case where a new elementary unit evolves from 
an interaction—from a process—and where a process 
becomes an object—a gene.9 And as an object, it begins to 
accept the kind of operations that the system can apply to 
other objects. It is now interacting directly and indirectly 
with many other units.
A critical point in the above now calls for reflection. It 
takes time for two elements to undergo separate regulation 
and transcription in order to come together into a functional 
unit or interaction. But when they come together evolution-
arily into one genetic unit, regulated as one and performing 
through one product, this time is cut to zero. Previously, the 
joint effect of these two elements came into being as devel-
opmental interactions do; now it is “innate”—it is a gene. 
It no longer needs to be constructed from more-elementary 
units, and it exerts its effect in interaction with other (now-
peer) elementary units, in which context it has phenotypic 
meaning. The emphasis here is not on the actual amount of 
time cut, but on the local network simplification that this 
process represents.
Thus, in the gradual fusion of two elements into one, we 
see a sense of evolutionary acceleration of developmental 
interactions; and if this fusion is preceded by the copying 
of those two elements, we see at the same time an increase 
in the “genetic vocabulary,” which comes together with 
an increase in the extent of higher-level interactions—an 
increase in complexity.
Having thus formed a clear view of acceleration and 
the arising of new interactions with the help of the gene 
fusion case, it is important to step back again and observe 
these two aspects from a broader viewpoint. It is enough 
to consider the copying of modules and the changing of 
regulatory connections between them (prior to considering 
actual gene fusion) in order to notice that these changes of 
connections can be seen from two angles: When we look 
at the lower levels of organization—at the tightening of 
connections between nodes—we see an increase in innate 
abilities. When we look at the higher levels of organiza-
tion—at the increase in the extent of interactions between 
modules due to the appearance of new modules—we see an 
increase in the complexity of the life-form, the phenotype. 
9 See Deutscher (2010) and Byers (2010) for conceptually relevant 
processes in other realms.
Importantly, these are two facets of one integrated process: 
the new parts observed at the lower levels (which are due 
to constriction) and the new whole (which is due to the 
increase in the extent of high-level interactions) coevolve. 
The novelty comes from network-level change, not from a 
sequence of independent, atomistic changes. And, as will 
be discussed, adaptation comes together with innateness—
with automatization.
Notice also that there are useful operators in the evolu-
tion of networks: The copying of nodes along with their 
connections adds syntactic material to the network from 
the inside, which serves as a basis for increasing complex-
ity. The chunking of nodes and the severing of connections 
between nodes allows nodes to separate from their previous 
context and join new contexts gradually.
One important point about this section is that there is a 
sense of an Archimedes screw–like operation in network-
level evolution. An Archimedes screw is a helical surface 
wrapped around a shaft inside a pipe that is designed to 
carry water up from one side of the pipe to another as the 
screw rotates. Each point rotates at its own level, yet due 
to that rotation, water flows up. Likewise, in network-level 
evolution, when a genetic interaction is replaced by a gene 
in the course of evolution, or when a behavioral sequence 
with environmental triggers is replaced by an instinct, there 
is a sense of a transfer of meaning from higher to lower lev-
els of organization—from phenotype to genotype—despite 
the fact that materialistic changes like movements of genes 
are confined to their respective levels; that is, the pheno-
type does not actually become a genotype. This will help us 
replace the notion of novelty from a local genetic accident 
with the following: novelty arises at the system level and is 
then crystallized in an evolutionary process based on muta-
tional operators working under natural selection.
2.3  The Gradual Evolution of Innateness of Alternative 
Splicing Patterns Results in Exon Shuffling
As mentioned in Sect. 2, traditional discussions on the evo-
lution of chimeric genes seem to assume that they arise by 
sudden, fortuitous events. In contrast, I argued that they are 
generated by gradual evolutionary processes that set the 
conditions for fusion. Importantly, the same kind of mecha-
nisms discussed in the case of the TRIM5-CypA fusion, 
under the network-based view of evolution proposed in the 
last section, can be connected to the general question of 
how exon shuffling and alternative splicing patterns evolve.
“Exon shuffling” refers to the fact that homologous 
exons can appear in different genetic contexts in differ-
ent species or even the same species. “Alternative splic-
ing” refers to the fact that, in eukaryotes, multiple products 
can be generated from different combinations of exons 
(whether the exons are taken from nearby as in the case of 
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cis-splicing, or from different loci as in the case of trans-
splicing). The former implies a process in evolutionary 
time. The latter is a process in developmental time. Now, 
we know that there are cases where the same exons are 
being trans-spliced in one species or strain but cis-spliced 
in another (Kong et  al. 2015), such as the exons of the 
separate eri-6 and eri-7 in C. elegans strain N2 and their 
fused homologs in C. briggsae and in other strains of C. 
elegans (Fischer et al. 2008). Likewise, we know that some 
functions are achieved by multiple single-module proteins 
in one species but by a single, multi-module protein in 
another, where the genetic sequences encoding these mod-
ules are fused (Graur and Li 2000). For example, the activi-
ties required for the synthesis of fatty acids from acetyl-
CoA are carried on by discrete monofunctional proteins in 
most bacteria, and are encoded by two unlinked genes in 
fungi (Chirala et al. 1987; Mohamed et al. 1988) and by a 
single multi-exon gene in animals (Amy et  al. 1992) (see 
Graur and Li 2000). While a connection between exon 
shuffling and alternative splicing was suggested as soon as 
the latter was discovered (Gilbert 1978), I offer to sharpen 
the nature of this connection, since the abovementioned 
facts connect with the preceding sections: When one of two 
exons that used to be trans-spliced is now translocated and 
fused to the other genetically (or becomes cis-spliced to it), 
we have a case that fits the TRIM5-CypA fusion case—that 
could be explained mechanistically in the same (or a simi-
lar) way. In other words, translocations that are part of the 
evolution of alternative splicing patterns that would have 
been considered from a traditional perspective as sudden, 
stochastic events could be outcomes of gradual evolution-
ary processes involving genetic mechanisms in the sense of 
Sect.  2. Thus, I argue that exon shuffling is the gradually 
evolved, innate state of alternative splicing. Namely, what 
is constructed in developmental time is gradually replaced 
in evolutionary time with new innate elements and a new 
developmental construction. Specifically, when two exons 
previously spliced together at the RNA level are now fused 
at the DNA level, it is a case where a process in develop-
mental time—a splicing pattern affected by various fac-
tors—has become an innate object—a gene fusion, emanci-
pated from the influence of those factors.
The gradual evolutionary process that brings two genetic 
elements to work tightly together and sets the genetic con-
ditions for mechanistic fusion can itself occur according to 
the principles of interaction-based evolution as discussed 
by Livnat (2013). One may hypothesize that alleles evolv-
ing at multiple loci gradually change the regulation of the 
alternative splicing pattern in the focal gene as well as in 
other, coevolving genes. Genetic information from these 
loci can then be gradually collected by non-random muta-
tion (Livnat 2013), setting the new genetic sequences as 
well as the new alternative splicing patterns that we see 
today. In other words, many mutation-writing events, in 
each of many individuals, in each of many generations, 
under natural selection, gradually pave the way for network 
evolution at the gene level, as will be discussed in Sect. 5.
Consistent with the above, Stone and Schwartz (1990) 
hypothesized that separate genes whose products first 
aggregated in the cytosol to form a functioning enzyme 
could later become fused at the DNA level. They sug-
gested, as an example, that the different lobes of an enzyme 
such as glyceraldehyde-3-phosphate dehydrogenase may 
have come from separate genes far in the past, before 
those genes became genetically fused; and that this could 
also explain the existence of a family of dehydrogenases, 
each of which has fused the same gene encoding the NAD 
binding protein with differently mutated copies of the gene 
encoding the substrate binding domain. Furthermore, West-
Eberhard (2003) predicted that the connection between 
evolution and development will be found in the connection 
between exon shuffling and alternative splicing and in other 
phenomena (West-Eberhard 2003). This paper agrees with 
them on these points and adds that the gene-fusion case is 
merely an example of a more general principle according 
to which elements absorb novel phenotypic meaning from 
their gradually changing context under interaction-based 
evolution (as will be discussed more in this paper; see also 
Livnat 2013).
2.4  Novelty Comes Neither from a Point Nor from DNA 
“Misspelling”
Now, gene fusion may be discussed as one topic, and coop-
tion as another. But they are actually two sides of the same 
coin. In both cases we see elements or copies thereof leav-
ing their previous context and moving to a new context. But 
although fusion and cooption are parts of the same process, 
the case of fusion is especially grabbing to the eye, because 
it shows the creation of a new elementary unit in a manner 
that traditional theory has not prepared us for. In traditional 
theory, there is point mutation and presumed genetic nov-
elty from it,10 and there is gene duplication followed by 
point mutations in the duplicates (Lynch 2007); but there is 
no evolutionary process where a process can become an 
object—where a new elementary unit is created from some-
thing that previously was an interaction (indeed, this new 
elementary unit absorbs new meaning from its gradually 
changing context).
Two remarks are important. First, this manner of creat-
ing a new elementary unit requires the existence of a hier-
archical structure of organization—a network—where, by a 
gradual change in the network, such a process can happen. 
10 For modern literature on novelty, see Sect. 4.16.
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Since this hierarchical structure does exist and is a funda-
mental aspect of nature, it is an advantage of the present 
theory that it engages this structure. Second, the gradual 
creation of a new elementary unit from what was previ-
ously an interaction is important because it shows us that 
the barrier between “unit” and “interaction” has been 
broken. There is no sharp dividing line between elementary 
units and higher-level interactions. The collapse of the gene 
concept as a well-defined unit (Gerstein et al. 2007) is sup-
portive of this absence of a sharp division between process 
and object11 and fits with a gradual process of gene forma-
tion (Livnat 2013; Carvunis et al. 2012).
Indeed, while this paper is consistent with modern lit-
erature on novelty in important ways to be discussed in 
Sect. 4.16, it is fundamentally different from the traditional 
view of evolution prevalent at the foundation of the mod-
ern synthesis. Not only does the traditional view focus on 
object minus context and imply that novelty arises in the 
object by a local genetic accident that emanates this novelty 
“upward” to the complex system—novelty from a point—
but in addition, this point-like change is considered to be 
an error akin to a “misspelling.” If we let genes be words, 
metaphorically speaking, and let the phenotype be the tech-
nology that they describe, then the traditional notion of 
mutation can be exemplified by misspelling unintention-
ally the word “incubate” while making all effort to copy it 
accurately, and thus suddenly getting the idea of inventing 
an incubator. Whereas in reality, the incubator (i.e., tech-
nology, or the phenotype) is invented by the use of many 
concepts described by putting together many words; and 
in the long-term, the whole complex object that is an incu-
bator might even be given a standard, symbolic name by 
which this whole has come to be referred to conveniently: 
the word “incubator,” generated by a standard operation of 
adding the appropriate suffix to a preexisting, useful word. 
From the view of interaction-based evolution, to say that 
the “misspelling” of genes (accidental mutation) is the 
source of biological novelty is to make a mistake in under-
standing the nature and the role of the bottom level of the 
genetic interaction hierarchy, similar to saying that the mis-
spelling of words creates technology.
Considering all of the above, a main point of this paper 
is that evolution is a “bottomless system”.12 One cannot 
define all words in the dictionary in terms of other words 
without getting into a circularity. Ultimately, the meaning 
of words comes from the context of their usage; that is how 
11 We now know that genetic elements previously thought to par-
ticipate in “one” gene actually form products together with elements 
previously thought to belong exclusively to “other” genes, and so the 
boundaries between genes have been blurred.
12 This term, which aptly describes one of the most important points 
of this paper, was proposed by Nick Pippenger.
language is learned and even how it evolves. The genes are 
similar in this regard. Their meaning comes from the con-
text of their usage. They themselves are nodes in a network, 
in development as well as in evolution. Thus, the bottom of 
the hierarchy of biological interactions—the genetic 
sequence—is not a stable ground upward from which life is 
built. Mutation is not a local accident that brings innova-
tion all on its own as though there is no living network that 
it needs to connect to. The process of genetic change is a 
complex one where the connections between nodes in the 
network become stronger and weaker as they form modules 
that absorb meaning from context.
Traditionally, we have been thinking about an accident, 
disconnected from the living network, as an event that 
creates new genetic information. This was conceived as a 
point-like event, which then emanates the novelty that it 
brings about to the phenotypic level (but see Sect. 4.16 for 
modern developments). I argue instead that novelty arises 
from network-level change, and that this requires non-acci-
dental mutation that executes network change in a syntactic 
and evolving fashion (Livnat 2013).
3  Simplification and Novelty
For Darwin as well as for Fisher (Fisher 1930), complexity 
evolved in cases where an increase in it was needed for an 
increase in fitness. However, the question of why complex-
ity evolves has never been resolved (Wagner 2014, p. 11). I 
argue here that simplification under performance pressure 
leads to both complexity and novelty.
This section will be entirely devoted to discussing con-
cepts. Once they are discussed, numerous empirical exam-
ples will be brought forth in Sect. 4.
3.1  Simplification Under Performance Pressure Leads 
to Complexity
Several points in the present theory may be organized under 
the heading of “simplification,” each of which comes with 
its own corresponding increase in complexity, as shown 
below.
Modularity and Simplification 
–– Simplification and modularity are tightly connected 
concepts. A module serves multiple contexts—in fact it 
is defined by them—and in the case where one serves 
the many, as in the case where one explains the many, 
there is frugality, parsimony, or simplification.
–– I discussed above the gradual appearance of modules in 
networks. A key example of the appearance of a mod-
ule was the fusion of two genetic elements. Here, the 
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developmental process originally putting them together 
is simplified away in the course of evolution. More gen-
erally, the gradual arising of new modules from a pre-
viously complex, interconnected mass of nodes is the 
evolutionary streamlining, or simplification, of develop-
ment. Elements inside a module are emancipated from 
the complex influence of elements that are now outside 
of it and are no longer connected to it.
Innateness and Simplification 
–– As will be shown soon, an extension of the last point 
is the evolution of innateness, which involves evolved 
independence from environmental triggers. During evo-
lution, an evolving trait can become emancipated from 
complex environmental influence involved in the devel-
opment of an adaptive ancestral phenotype as a more 
orderly, simplified and compartmentalized developmen-
tal process evolves. Thus, the evolution of innateness 
involves simplification: what consumed developmental 
(and sometimes learning) time is simplified away in the 
course of evolution.
Now, the cases of simplification described above come 
together with an increase in complexity. As argued ear-
lier, due to the duplication of genes, the formation of a 
new module need not come at the expense of old modules. 
The increase in the number of modules or elementary units 
comes together with an increase in the number of interac-
tions between such modules or units, which represents an 
increase in complexity. Simplification is what we see when 
we look at the modularization of an interconnected mass, 
and complexity is what we see when we look at emerging 
interactions involving newly formed modules. Local simpli-
fication leads to a global increase in complexity.
The Final Touch of Perfection 
There are observations that show the development of 
organs or tissues taking ever straighter paths over evolution-
ary time (Müller 1869). For example, in cetacean embryos 
(e.g., whales and dolphins), hind limb buds still appear 
fleetingly in development and grow to a small size before 
they are removed (Sedmera et  al. 1997). In such cases, it 
is evident that, over evolutionary time, the developmental 
process gradually comes to spend less and less time and 
energy on developing structure that is slated to be super-
seded by another or to be removed later in development.
How does it happen that evolution straightens up devel-
opmental paths? A neo-Darwinian answer is that the sav-
ings of time and energy are directly favored by natural 
selection, so that a whale that acquires by chance a muta-
tion that reduces the development of the useless bones by 
even a small amount gains a slight benefit in terms of sur-
vival and reproduction, and thus accidental mutations of 
this sort are passed on preferentially. However, is it reason-
able that a slight straightening of the developmental path of 
useless, internal small bones is truly enough to make such 
an impact on differential survival and reproduction that 
would be noticeable, when many and more important other 
individual differences may be contributing to differential 
success?
This problem of the obliteration of rudimentary organs 
is a very old one (Darwin 1859). Darwin himself agreed 
that it was unreasonable to explain the removal of rudimen-
tary organs as an outcome of natural selection based on 
minute economic considerations alone (Darwin 1876,  pp. 
309–402). Indeed, he held steadfastly to the Lamarckian 
“laws of use and disuse” and more to explain them, which 
is remarkable in light of the sections to follow on innate-
ness. The same problem was discussed by Weismann hand 
in hand with that of the final touch of perfection—how 
adaptations become perfected beyond what may be possible 
by traditional means (Weismann 1902). Wiesmann, who is 
considered the father of neo-Darwinism, explained the final 
touch of perfection by suggesting a principle of “momen-
tum” or “inertia,” where a mutation in a certain direction 
will be followed by others in the same direction, so that 
noticeable, selected improvements of economy will be fol-
lowed up by minute, unselected ones (Weismann 1902). 
Interestingly, this point is completely outside of the view 
based on random mutation and natural selection, a view 
which traces its ideological origins to Weismann (Winther 
2001; Gould 2002). Thus, it is instructive that the two 
greatest pillars of neo-Darwinism went to great lengths to 
look for alternatives to the twentieth century’s explanation-
of-choice based on economical considerations alone.13
Interaction-based evolution offers such an alternative: 
simplification under performance pressure. Instead of rely-
ing on economical considerations under accidental muta-
tion and natural selection alone, it argues that an active, 
mechanistic force of simplification drives the “final touch 
of perfection,” both in the complete obliteration of a trait 
and in the crystallization of adaptation, as will be discussed 
in Sects. 4.8, 4.12 and 4.13 (notice, for example, the predic-
tion that stereotypy in general, as well as schematization in 
rituals, is due to simplification under performance pressure 
rather than due to benefits of improved clarity of signals; 
Sect. 4.8).
Now, notice again the connection between simplifi-
cation and complexity: the intriguing straightening of 
13 While excellent reviews are available on the nineteenth century 
literature on this very general question (Gould 1977, 2002), I do not 




developmental paths demonstrated by the unexplained old 
observations is tied to the “final touch of perfection”—a 
convergence on an optimum in the evolution of a complex 
adaptation.
Convergence, Simplification and Complexity 
According to interaction-based evolution (Livnat 2013), sex-
ual reproduction and non-accidental mutation combine infor-
mation from different loci and from different individuals that 
succeeded in survival and reproduction. Alleles at different 
loci concomitantly spreading in the population do not each 
bring an independent piece of the phenotype to all individu-
als, but rather interact with each other. Thus, an adaptation 
evolves at the level of the population as a whole, at the same 
time as it becomes more genetically stable (see Sect. 4.10; 
Livnat 2013). This process slowly gives rise to the true, com-
mon reason for success shared by individuals, as the initially 
many and highly variable ways by which different individu-
als approximate the adaptation only roughly at first are grad-
ually superseded by an adaptation, uniform across individu-
als (see nest-digging by sand wasps, discussed in Sect. 4.12; 
see also Livnat 2013). We may now note that in this replace-
ment of many by one—of the different rough approxima-
tions by one uniform adaptation—there is simplification. At 
the same time, this one that replaces the many is a complex 
adaptation—a point of optimality. Therefore, simplification 
and complexity again come together: the complexity that is 
in the different ways of approaching an adaptation has been 
converted into the complexity of the adaptation itself.
Simplification and Complexity: Summary 
We have seen that each of the above connections to sim-
plification comes together with an increase in complexity. 
Could simplification under performance pressure (e.g., 
under selection) be the cause of the evolution of complex-
ity? This question is best answered together with another, 
related question, discussed next: What is the source of nov-
elty in evolution?
3.2  The Problem of Novelty
This paper will be entirely consistent with foundational lit-
erature on the origin of novelty (e.g., Müller 1990; Müller 
and Wagner 1991; West-Eberhard 2003; Müller and New-
man 2005; Moczek 2008; Wagner and Lynch 2010; Hall-
grímsson et al. 2012; Hall and Kerney 2012; Brigandt and 
Love 2012; Peterson and Müller 2013; Wagner 2014) in 
that both agree on the fact that network-level evolution is 
key to novelty and on multiple fundamental points that fol-
low from it (Sect. 4.16). It will also attempt to contribute to 
that literature in several ways. However, these connections 
will only be clear in Sect. 4.16, after the required concepts 
and examples are covered. In the meantime, suffice it to say 
that I will use the term “novelty” broadly in a way that is 
different from how it has been used before to simply mean 
“something that is new” while keeping an eye on the fact 
that any heritable change, whether big or small, represents 
some amount of new genetic information (it requires some 
genetic or epigenetic change/s). The question I will focus 
on is where does this new genetic information come from? 
Does it come from a local genetic accident and the only 
“smarts” involved is in the genotype-phenotype map? I 
will connect these questions to simplification under perfor-
mance pressure and to network-level evolution. My high-
level point will be that, even if genetic changes are mecha-
nistically driven, novelty can still arise from the unexpected 
interaction between these changes. Thus, simplification 
under performance pressure and network-level evolution 
remove the need for accidental mutation to be the source of 
new genetic information (Sect. 5.2).
3.3  A Dilemma Regarding Novelty and the Nature 
of Mutation
Besides the fact that it does not apply to multicellulars in an 
appealing manner, Lamarckism has another problem which 
is fundamentally related to novelty: hypothetically speak-
ing, even if mutational mechanisms knew what would have 
been favored by natural selection in a particular organism at 
a particular point in time and how to produce it, this would 
not have solved the problem of how novelty in the sense 
above arises, because the novelty would have been in how 
such supposed mechanisms acquired that particular knowl-
edge to begin with. Indeed, it is easy to erroneously think 
that, if there is knowledge of the thing to be produced, there 
is no novelty, and if it is to be produced without knowledge, 
it must be produced by accident. Thus, we can understand 
the immense attraction of accidental mutation from a tradi-
tional perspective: First, it requires no Lamarckian mech-
anism transferring knowledge from the macroscale to the 
genotype. Second, accident has no preconceptions, and it 
seems to have been believed that it can invent the required 
new genetic information.
As articulated by Livnat (2013), it is a key property 
of interaction-based evolution that the non-accidental 
mutation that it proposes does not circumvent, but rather 
works together with, natural selection, and is strictly non-
Lamarckian. This removes the first reason above to hold 
on to accidental mutation. However, the second problem 
still needs to be addressed: if the mutational mechanisms 
are not “aware” of the environment, how could mutation 
be anything other than accidental? How could the ultimate 
source of new genetic information in evolution be anything 
other than random mutation?
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3.4  Simplification Under Performance Pressure Leads 
to Novelty
To try to answer this question, let us allow ourselves to step 
outside of evolution and look at how novelty arises in other 
creative processes.
Consider the development of scientific theories. It has 
two fundamental principles. First, theories need to fit the 
data—they need to perform. Second, they must be parsimo-
nious. When we take disconnected facts and find a theory 
that explains them all in one, we create a more parsimoni-
ous picture of reality than existed before. It is a fortunate 
fact of nature that when we do so we often obtain a model 
of reality that will hold better when new and unexpected 
data later arises and that will lead to findings not previously 
expected.
A well known example of the use of parsimony in sci-
ence is the Copernican revolution—the placing of the sun 
instead of the earth at the center of the solar system. Coper-
nicus proposed this model not because it allowed him to 
make better predictions of the movements of the planets, 
but because it was simpler on an essential point (Singh 
2004). This simpler model paved the way to future science, 
generally fitting with major later findings by Kepler and 
Galileo, like the phases of Venus.
From this and many other examples we see that the pur-
suit of parsimony does not merely provide elegance per se. 
Parsimony expectedly brings the unexpected—useful things 
that were not initially predicted and were not the goal of the 
work, yet commonly appear as a result of work. By simpli-
fying under performance pressure we do not act randomly. 
Rather, we put work in, and get novelty out: a new, useful 
prediction or connection emerges that was not originally 
expected. Thus, it is not the case that either one knows 
one’s goal and there is no novelty in getting there, or one 
does not know it and the only way to get there is by acci-
dent. Rather, there is a third way to novelty.
Several important comments follow. First, we need 
not explain why simplification under performance pres-
sure leads to novel, useful things in science that were not 
directly sought. For now, we may simply take it as a grand 
fact.
Second, importantly, this simplification does not make 
science as a whole simpler but rather more complex. As 
new theories connect between previously unconnected 
facts, new predictions and new questions arise. The more 
knowns there are, the more they interact and expand our 
ability to ask yet new questions. Thus, I argue that simpli-
fication under performance pressure leads to both novelty 
and complexity.
Third, simplification and performance function together. 
As statisticians or investigators in machine learning know, 
it is useless to make a model that predicts a given set of 
data points perfectly if the model is overly complicated, as 
it is useless to set up a model that is very simple but has 
nothing to do with the data. A balance must be maintained 
between fit to data and model elegance, and to maintain it 
is an art.
Indeed, the desires for simplicity and for performance 
are conflicting: at the time when Galileo originally favored 
the Copernican over the Ptolemaic system, he did it despite 
the fact that the former fit the data a little worse, and 
because of the fact that it was much more parsimonious. 
Indeed, later scientific research showed that the more parsi-
monious model was far more improvable.
The development of mathematics gives us a similar pic-
ture. It happened once and again in history that pure math-
ematicians working on the principles of aesthetics or parsi-
mony have produced things that years later were found to 
have unexpected utilitarian value (Wigner 1960; Hamming 
1980; Byers 2010). Indeed, the power of operations other 
than the test of performance in the growth of mathemati-
cal and scientific knowledge has been amply demonstrated. 
We see it in simplification or parsimony, elegance or aes-
thetics, symmetry, pattern completion and analogy (Wigner 
1960; Hamming 1980; Byers 2010). I use the word “sim-
plification” in this paper in a very broad sense to refer to 
all such variants and the creative force they represent. Note 
also that in both mathematics and science, we operate with 
a network of concepts. We connect between ideas to create 
a fuzzy, new idea, distill a fuzzy new idea to its essence, 
and pursue the consequences of a distilled idea to new con-
nections (Christos Papadimitriou and Umesh Vazirani, per-
sonal communications). Thus, novelty arises from the net-
work, not from random, point-like changes. This network 
change is driven by both simplification and performance, 
and we can see that it leads to complexity, novelty and 
improvement.
The evolution of technology is also illustrative. What is 
simple appears in many different technologies. The concept 
of a disc appears in the potter’s wheel, in wheels for trans-
portation, in a round table, and in the cross section of a tree 
trunk. The concept of a sharp edge appears in a stone tool, 
a peg, and even a shingle roof. Once we generate a func-
tional but elegant object in one context, it is going to have 
the inherent capacity of working well in future, different 
contexts.
I argue here that, also in biological evolution, simplifica-
tion and performance pressure, and not accidental mutation 
and performance pressure, drive complexity, novelty and 
advancement. This new theory has an advantage over the 
previous one. When we rely on simplification under perfor-
mance pressure, we rely on something that we can see to be 
central to other creative processes.
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A key aspect of simplification is that it allows us to cir-
cumvent the problem posed earlier: how can mutation do 
anything useful, how can it be anything besides accidental, 
without “awareness” of the environment and the macro-
scale phenotype? The solution is that work that simplifies 
local connections in the genetic network requires no 
Lamarckian knowledge of the macroscale phenotype and 
the environment, and can take place in the germ cells. That 
is, while local simplification and gene duplication opera-
tions take place in the germ cells, natural selection evalu-
ates the organism as a complex whole, and together these 
two forces lead to novelty. This allows us to replace the 
concept of accidental mutation with a concept of non-acci-
dental mutation that is useful yet not Lamarckian, and thus 
to replace the traditional notion of random mutation as the 
ultimate source of new heritable information in 
evolution.14
3.5  Where Simplification and Performance Pressure 
Happen
In addition to simplification pressure at the genetic level 
and performance pressure at the organismal level, each of 
the two may have, at its own level, the other on the other 
side of the coin. For example, in an ecological community, 
each species is pressing to produce more of itself and at 
the same time is undoing the growth of others, thus press-
ing to simplify the ecological network. The same could be 
said of a gene that comes to replace another in the course 
of evolution by usurping the other’s role, a phenomenon 
called “genetic piracy” by Roth (1988) (see also Wagner 
2014). The ecological example above clarifies that simpli-
fication can be as natural as differential survival. In fact, 
here simplification and differential survival are two sides of 
the same coin: inasmuch as the making more of one entity 
means making less of another, the performance of any one 
entity puts simplification pressure on the network, and this 
principle may apply both to the ecological network and to 
the genetic network. It is also noteworthy in this regard that 
14 Remarks: First, the work referred to requires no Lamarckian 
knowledge of the macroscale phenotype and the immediate environ-
ment, but genetic influences on mutation can still evolve in the long-
term based on the principles of interaction-based evolution. Second, 
while one may argue that simplification under performance pressure 
could work in addition to rather than instead of accidental mutation 
and natural selection, the goal of this paper is first and foremost to 
provide a conceptual alternative to accidental mutation and natural 
selection as a sieve, rather than to decide whether or not accidental 
mutation is in operation as far as adaptive evolution is concerned. 
Third, for more on the connection between simplification and non-
accidental mutation, see in Sect. 5.2.
a gene that is extensively used (performs well) and is there-
fore highly expressed may, due to mutational mechanisms, 
be more likely to be duplicated. This will be relevant in 
Sect. 5.5.
3.6  Simplification and Novelty: Summary
We have seen in this section ideas according to which sim-
plification under performance pressure leads to novelty, 
complexity and high performance. We have seen that these 
ideas are fundamentally connected to network-level evolu-
tion. The next section will examine various relevant empiri-
cal facts.
4  The Problem of Innateness
The evolution of innateness has been one of the oldest and 
most mysterious problems in evolution (Lamarck 1809; 
Darwin 1859; Duerden 1920; Waddington 1942; Lorenz 
1966). We have seen the evolution of innateness at the 
genetic level in the cases of gene fusion and the evolution 
of alternative splicing patterns, and we will now see it at 
the organismal level. Although the empirical facts to be 
discussed are known, they have not yet been used to make a 
new argument about the nature of the evolutionary process. 
I will focus on examples from the evolution of behavior, 
thus complementing past literature on novelty, which has 
focused on morphological evolution (Müller 1990; Mül-
ler and Wagner 1991; Müller and Newman 2005; Moczek 
2008; Wagner and Lynch 2010; Hall and Kerney 2012; 
Hallgrímsson et al. 2012; Peterson and Müller 2013).
I will first cover innateness from multiple angles in 
Sects. 4.1–4.11, and then discuss the emergence of novelty 
in detail (Sect. 4.13). We will see that improvement, innate-
ness, novelty and stabilization all come together as differ-
ent aspects of one process. At the end of Sect. 4, both the 
consistency with past literature on novelty and the contri-
butions to it will be clear (Sect.  4.16). Readers interested 
in the molecular level may note that it will be revisited in 
Sect. 5.
4.1  The Problem of the Preexistence of High‑Level 
Mechanisms
The ability of pointer dogs to point at the prey in a statu-
esque manner is to a large degree innate (Arkwright 1902). 
How did this instinct evolve? To argue that a sequence of 
random mutations of small effects has built up the behav-
ior from scratch such that it has always been instinctive and 
never learned is unappealing: Would breeders have recog-
nized slight inborn tendencies to point at the beginning of 
the evolutionary process involved and, without regard for 
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the outcome of any training, base their artificial selection 
on these differences? And if training were important in 
the evolution of pointing, one may expect that the highly 
evolved abilities of the animal to learn would have masked 
out presumed mutations of slight effect for an indepen-
dently developed instinct. All would be much more under-
standable if we consider that a trait that previously required 
learning through reward and/or punishment has become 
emancipated in the course of evolution from these external 
cues.
Consider the evolution of migration. In an instinctive 
and automatic manner, a young common cuckoo (Cucu-
lus canorus) takes off in the fall from its breeding grounds 
in Scandinavia, flies thousands of miles to its wintering 
site in Central Africa and then returns in the spring (Wil-
lemoes et al. 2014). How did this complex suite of instincts 
get started in evolution? Both Darwin (Romains 1883) and 
Wallace (1874) hypothesized that the breeding and winter-
ing grounds gradually became separated and the distance 
between them increased; that originally, the animals were 
tracking seasonal changes in resources over short distances 
as a direct response to the environment; and that in time 
this behavior became habitual and instinctive (Romains 
1883; Wallace 1874; see also Woodbury 1941). To assume 
that the migratory instinct evolved afresh, independently of 
the behavior that came before it, brings up the same prob-
lem as in the case of the pointer dogs: the pre-existence of 
an evolved, general-level mechanism (in these cases, the 
brain) that is able to respond adaptively to environmen-
tal changes and was presumably involved in the original 
phenotype.
In an experiment designed to capture the evolution of 
innateness (Waddington 1953) (see also Waddington 1956, 
2006, 1959; Bateman 1959a, b), Waddington took Dros-
ophila melanogaster flies and exposed their pupae to a heat 
shock. As a result, a fair number of the flies that developed 
showed a particular vein pattern on their wings called 
“crossveinless”.15 He then bred the crossveinless flies to 
form the next generation of the experiment and repeated 
this procedure of heat shock and selective breeding over the 
generations. As a result, the percentage of crossveinless 
flies increased over the generations and, beginning at gen-
eration 14, a small percentage of flies started showing the 
new vein pattern without exposure to heat shock, that is, 
innately16 (Waddington 1953). The intriguing experimental 
outcome was that this trait became innate, even though no 
selection for such innateness was performed.
15 The pattern consisted of an absence of or a gap in the posterior 
crossvein and sometimes the anterior one too.
16 In order to observe this, the experimenters took at each generation 
a certain sample of flies and raised them without heat shock.
To explain this outcome, called “genetic assimilation” 
(Waddington 1953), Stern (1958) (see also Falconer 1960) 
proposed a model based on traditional principles. The 
model assumes the preexistence of alleles that make inde-
pendent contributions toward a certain sum, such that if the 
sum surpasses a certain threshold, the trait of interest is 
exhibited. Furthermore it makes certain assumptions about 
the initial frequencies of alleles and the normal and experi-
mental conditions thresholds that make it so that, prior to 
selection, the trait of interest (e.g., crossveinless) is exhib-
ited in practice only under experimental conditions (e.g., 
heat shock), whereas post selection it is exhibited under 
both experimental and normal conditions, and thus the trait 
can be said to have become innate. However, despite the 
mathematical crispness of this model, taken literally, it 
means that every trait that is to become innate has its own 
set of additive alleles that preexist and provide the potential 
for that trait to become innate as is. That is, there are addi-
tive alleles that, if they surpass a threshold, build a brain 
that points, and there are different sets of additive alleles 
lying dormant in birds for every possible migration route, 
such that each set builds a brain for a particular route if it 
surpasses a certain threshold.17 Indeed, Waddington him-
self rejected this model (Waddington 1958, 1961), because 
it did not apply to the complex natural cases that motivated 
the problem. Here, I will provide another explanation for 
innateness based on interaction-based evolution.
4.2  Modularity and Innateness are Caused 
by Simplification
As Waddington (1942) alluded to, when an emerging mod-
ule is released from the influence of an element inside the 
organism, the result is seen as modularization; and when 
it is released from the influence of an environmental fac-
tor, the result is seen as the evolution of innateness. In 
Sects. 2.2 and 3.1 I argued that simplification is connected 
to modularity and innateness: the formation of modules 
streamlines the developmental process and involves eman-
cipation of an emerging module from complex influences, 
both internal and external. Indeed, simplification leads to 
modularity and innateness.
17 In fact, once we assume that Stern’s model taken at face value is 
alone the relevant mode of explanation, it would have been easier to 
assume that complex instincts in nature evolve afresh, without rela-
tion to a preexisting behavior modulated by a brain and modified by 
the environment, because the model does not describe a world where 
such a relation is biologically reasonable—it requires a brain that 
affects independently each threshold expediently assumed for each 
particular trait that is to become innate, each with its own expediently 
assumed set of additive alleles.
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Approaching the topic of innateness equipped with the 
theory of gradual network change presented here, it is use-
ful to distinguish between two important phenomena that 
I will call “emancipation” and “acceleration.” Emancipa-
tion refers to the fact that units (modules or elements) can 
be copied and the connections between units can gradually 
evolve such that a unit can be subjected to different regu-
lation than that of its source copy. Acceleration refers to 
the idea that the coming together of units under one con-
trol simplifies development locally while absorbing novel 
phenotypic meaning from the changing context. Both these 
aspects of network level evolution, discussed in Sect. 2.2, 
will be clarified here with the help of examples, and both 
figure into the explanation of innateness to be given in the 
following sections.
4.3  The Evolution of Innateness is More Common 
than We Realize
In an idealized view of the crossveinless experiment, we 
can think of the crossveinless trait as qualitative (present 
or absent) and assume that it is the same in the beginning 
of the experiment as it is at the end. The only thing that 
evolves under this assumption is the propensity to produce 
it. In this case, we may simply use the word “emancipa-
tion” to describe what happens to the crossveinless trait 
when it comes to appear without the environmental trigger. 
But crossveinless is an extreme, chosen for its simplicity. In 
nature, when the evolution of innateness or emancipation 
takes place, the trait that is to become innate also evolves 
at the same time. For example, in cases of ritualization, a 
non-signaling behavior is gradually released from its con-
text and becomes used as a signal (e.g., an egg-fanning 
movement becomes a showing-the-nest signal, Tinbergen 
1951; see Sect.  4.6) (Huxley 1914; Whitman 1919; Arm-
strong 1950; Tinbergen 1952). As Tinbergen noted, those 
ritualized traits that are emancipated are usually traits that 
have already changed much from their original form; and 
we would not have been able to make a connection between 
the signal and its origin if it were not for the fact that, at 
least in some cases, there happened to be a transitional 
series betraying the connection between the two, such as in 
the threat posture of the Manchurian crane (Grus japonen-
sis) (Lorenz 1935; Tinbergen 1952). In other words, there 
exists a continuum of differences between the non-innate 
ancestral and the innate derived traits, that ranges from no 
difference, to a great difference that obscures the connec-
tion between the ancestral and the derived; and cases at the 
former end of the spectrum are rare.
I argue that this is precisely the problem with observ-
ing innateness. Darwin and other early naturalists believed 
that what is habitually performed due to environmental 
triggers over the generations gradually impresses itself 
on the hereditary constitution of the species and becomes 
innate and emancipated from the environment, and that 
this is explained by the laws of use and disuse, or Lamarck-
ism (Romains 1883; Darwin 1859). I argue that such 
automatization does happen in general but is often hard 
to see because of the difference between the ancestral and 
derived traits, and that it is network-level evolution and not 
Lamarckism that is responsible for it.
4.4  Evolution of the Whole as a Whole in Innateness
The fact that a trait changes as it becomes innate allows us 
to examine the evolution of a complex whole, while involv-
ing not only emancipation but also fusion and acceleration.
While I have been using the term “innate” without 
qualification so far, it is useful to note that there is no strict 
separation between the innate and the non-innate. Learning 
itself is enabled by instinct (Lorenz 1965; Gould and Mar-
ler 1986). No trait develops in a manner that is independent 
of the innate nature of the organism, and no trait develops 
entirely independently of the environment, when the lat-
ter is broadly construed (Lehrman 1953). Therefore, rather 
than speaking of “innate” and “non-innate,” we realize that 
there is a continuum between traits developed more directly 
and quickly (“innate”) and traits that require more unfold-
ing that involves more interactions with the environment.
When we consider this continuum as it applies to a given 
organism, we should consider that it evolves as a whole—
the process of development evolves as a whole. Then, we 
can bring the ideas of gradual network evolution to bear 
on it (Sect. 2). I argue here that the evolution of innateness 
arises as a result of the “chunking” or modularization of a 
previously complex part of the network—what were previ-
ously independent elements each under a different control 
have now become simplified or combined into a singe unit. 
Although it may seem that this simplification accelerates 
development in the course of evolution toward the final 
trait, in general, development is not accelerating toward 
the final trait as it was before, but rather toward what that 
trait has in the meantime changed into, and therefore noth-
ing is being accelerated strictly speaking. Therefore, it is 
the signature of the previously less innate that we gener-
ally see in the current more innate, rather than a direct fac-
simile. There is no Lamarckian transmission that takes a 
developed or a learned trait and makes it innate. As argued 
in Sect.  2.2, to use a metaphor, in an Archimedes screw, 
water is moved along the shaft even though each point in 
the screw only rotates at its own level. So in evolution, the 
non-innate does not itself become innate—the phenotypic 
does not become genotypic—but rather evolutionary action 
at each level of biological organization takes place within 
that level, while accelerating development.
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Indeed, we know that the adult form influences the evo-
lution of the earlier stages of development: there is selec-
tion on the adult form, and therefore there is selection on 
earlier stages of development to lead to a well-performing 
adult. When considered from a traditional standpoint, this 
trivial point turns into a problem because development is a 
complex process, and traditional evolutionary theory is not 
equipped to deal with a complex process. Traditional evo-
lutionary theory cannot conceive of a complex evolutionary 
change that modifies the developmental process as a com-
plex whole: it does not have a sense of acceleration18 or an 
emphasis on emancipation, and therefore when a trait 
appears earlier in development that seems to relate to one 
that used to come later in development (e.g., innate migra-
tion relates to earlier, learned migration), it absurdly has to 
invoke an evolution of that trait afresh, absent any connec-
tion to that which it obviously relates to. While Gould 
attempted to address this problem, he did so by breaking 
the whole again into parts and arguing that the timing of 
appearance of one part or a developmental process in and 
of itself can be moved earlier or later in development 
(Gould 1977), which is a very limited explanation that does 
not address the range of phenomena discussed here.
I have presented, in contrast, a view of the evolution of 
the whole as a whole. Instead of the evolution “afresh” idea 
that arises from a traditional perspective, this view raises 
the notion of acceleration as described: The quicker arriv-
ing at an evolving developmental outcome has the appear-
ance of the evolution of innateness, thus involving interac-
tion-based, network-level evolution in innateness. We have 
seen this in the case of the TRIM5-CypA fusion and the 
evolution of alternative splicing patterns at the molecular 
level, and will see it now in many examples at the organis-
mal level.
4.5  Example: Pointing in Pointer Dogs
Pointing in pointer dogs will serve as an example of the 
importance of the evolution of the whole as a whole in 
innateness. I propose that selection has operated on the 
outcome of the training, favoring hunting dogs whose 
behavior following training was more pleasing to their 
owners, specifically in stopping upon discovery of the prey 
instead of chasing it further. However, since innate tenden-
cies guide the learning, this selection has operated indi-
rectly on innate tendencies, favoring dogs with the right 
set of innate tendencies that were more naturally inclined 
to learn the right behavior. In particular, I hypothesize 
that there exists among animals a widespread tendency to 
18 But see the lively debate in the nineteenth century on it (Gould 
1977).
heed sudden changes; that in pointer dogs, this tendency 
has been strengthened in the course of evolution, in par-
ticular by heightening nervousness; and that other instincts 
have become at the same time adjusted to direct it pro-
ductively, helping the dogs to learn to pause and freeze at 
the sight of prey. Over the generations, the learning task 
has become more and more natural to the dogs, and the 
amount of learning required has decreased, until today, the 
dogs require only minimal training, and they sometimes 
point at objects innately without any learning, as Darwin 
observed (see  F. Darwin ed. 1909). Thus, selection for an 
improved outcome of the learning was accompanied by 
an acceleration of the learning and, ultimately, innateness. 
This hypothesis already has the advantage that it explains 
not only the evolution of the pointer dog instinct complex 
but also the nervousness syndrome that often afflicts these 
dogs: heightened nervousness helps them heed sudden 
changes, and when not properly compensated for results 
in the nervousness syndrome. Note that, while Grandin 
and Deesing (1998) argued before that pointing relates to 
nervousness, their discussion seems to assume that point-
ing and nervousness are traits with separate genetic causes 
that happen to be connected through genetic linkage, which 
suggests a spurious connection. In contrast, the hypothesis 
proposed here connects pointing and nervousness at a deep 
level, with the help of the holistic view of interaction-based 
evolution. There are no genes dedicated to pointing per se: 
pointing is a system-level phenomenon that emerges from a 
suite of interacting instincts and learning.
In an exceptionally inspiring chapter, Papaj has already 
argued that what is at first learned, over evolutionary time 
can come to be learned more quickly until it eventually 
becomes innate (Papaj 1993). In this respect, his hypoth-
esis is similar to the above. However, lacking the ideas of 
interaction-based evolution, and treating instinct and learn-
ing as separate elements, he tried to create a model of a tra-
ditional kind, and admitted that the model failed to provide 
an explanation, because the evolution of innateness came 
out of an artificiality built into it (Papaj 1993). In con-
trast, the hypothesis presented here allows us to preserve 
Papaj’s intuition but in a natural way: it holds that selec-
tion has affected interacting instincts that guide the com-
plex process of development and learning through a pro-
cess of network-based evolution, and network evolution in 
turn involves acceleration and emancipation—an increase 
in the innate abilities. In addition, interaction-based evolu-
tion also explains why innateness and stereotypy are deeply 
intertwined (see Sects. 4.10, 4.11), which Papaj admits his 
model does not (Papaj 1993).
To reiterate, I propose that the process of evolution 
toward a better outcome of the learning leads at the same 
time to a quickening of the learning and that ultimately, 
a new innate trait appears, because what enables the 
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organism to reach a better outcome through learning is that 
it is naturally inclined in the right direction. The organism 
“gets it” more, naturally and inherently, because underlying 
interacting instincts are being shaped. Thus, improvement 
comes together with innateness.
Importantly, the evolutionary process that shapes the 
network of underlying instincts can be seen as uncovering 
better “principles” that guide the learning (and more gener-
ally, development)—emerging underlying elements that 
organize a preexisting complex more simply. Consistent 
with Sect. 3 and with later sections (see Sect. 4.13), view-
ing things in terms of such principles leads us to a new pre-
diction regarding novelty: the evolution of the new innate 
and the new and improved adult form will come together 
with the production of new, beneficial things that were not 
selected for in and of themselves but arose as corollaries or 
windfalls of figuring out the right principles. Improvement, 
innateness, and generalization—or the emergence of useful 
novelty not selected for—come together. As an example, 
backing in pointer dogs19 may have evolved as a “corol-
lary” of pointing—an unintended but desirable outcome.
4.6  Elements of Network Evolution: Chunking, 
Duplication, Emancipation, Cooption 
and Rigidification
As noted, ritualization is an evolutionary process that 
occurs when a behavioral element is gradually emancipated 
from its original use as it becomes coopted for use as a sig-
nal in the course of evolution (see, among other sources, 
Huxley 1914; Whitman 1919; Armstrong 1950; Tinbergen 
1952 and further references below). For example, when a 
bird is about to hop or take flight, it bends its legs, low-
ers its breast, raises its hind parts and sometimes its tail, 
folds its neck and brings its head back almost to the shoul-
ders, while slightly expanding its wings, so that the whole 
body is like a tight spring ready to be released for jump-
ing, at which instant the legs straighten, the breast and hind 
parts line up with the direction of the jump, and the neck is 
stretched forward (Daanje 1951). Daanje argued that, from 
this movement, various signals have evolved. For example, 
when the male turkey displays to the female, it raises the 
hindparts a bit, raises and spreads its tail, folds its neck and 
brings its head back almost to the raised back feathers, and 
partly spreads its wings downwards. This posture imitates 
that of the jump in several elements, except that the legs 
are not bent, the tail and wing movements are exaggerated, 
and the posture is kept frozen for a while (Daanje 1951). 
19 “Backing” refers to the fact that these dogs copy the posture of 
another dog that is on point; even this behavior, which is of use to the 
hunters, is strongly innate.
Thus, a behavioral pattern which is widespread taxonomi-
cally and which originally had a mechanical function has 
evolved into a signal that is expressed in new contexts inde-
pendently of the context of expression of the ancestral trait.
Another example of ritualization is the way that the male 
three-spined stickleback (Gasterosteus aculeatus) shows 
the nest entrance to the female. According to Tinbergen, 
this movement was derived from the egg fanning move-
ment (Tinbergen 1951), which again demonstrates a shift 
from one context to another.
As we have just seen, ritualization requires emancipa-
tion from one context and cooption to another. Critically, 
these are operations of network evolution. The gradual 
release of an element from one context concomitant with 
the subjecting of it to another context involves two aspects 
of the organism at once and is inherently an interactive 
operation, well-described by modules moving in a network.
Baerends’s work on nest building, egg laying and off-
spring provisioning in the sand wasp Ammophila adri-
aansei (campestris) (Baerends 1941) demonstrates clearly 
that behavior is underlain by a network of modules. A 
normal behavioral sequence of the wasps is as follows: 
Build a nest; close the entrance temporarily with soil; fly 
away and hunt a caterpillar; carry the paralyzed caterpil-
lar back; reopen the nest; put the caterpillar in; lay an egg; 
close the entrance again, this time with greater care. Now 
build another nest and repeat the entire process so far. Now 
return to the first nest; open the closure; make an inspection 
visit. If the egg has hatched and the nest is in order, close 
the entrance, and now bring 1-3 caterpillars in succession. 
Repeat this second phase for the second nest. Now return 
to the first nest, open the closure and make an inspection 
visit. If all is in order, bring 3-7 caterpillars in succession; 
then make an especially careful final closure of the nest 
entrance. Repeat this third phase for the second nest. Now 
build another nest, and repeat all from the beginning. Fur-
thermore, if, in the first inspection described above, the egg 
has not hatched, the wasp may build another nest at that 
time. It can manage 4 nests at a time, with offspring at dif-
ferent ages at each nest requiring different amounts of pro-
visioning (based on information obtained in inspection vis-
its). If a nest has been disturbed, the wasp may abandon it.
A computer programmer would instantly recognize that 
the sand wasp’s behavior is an algorithm with subroutines 
(see flow chart in Fig. 1). The most parsimonious descrip-
tion of this behavior involves activation of the same behav-
ioral modules or subroutines, such as “carry a caterpillar 
to nest” or “perform an inspection visit” in different con-
texts, and the different contexts, namely the different stages 
of laying and provisioning, themselves consist of different 




Interestingly, Tinbergen wrote that the process underly-
ing emancipation was not known, though it must somehow 
involve natural selection (Tinbergen 1952). The present 
theory highlights how correct he was to emphasize that 
unknown. At once we can understand the inability of tradi-
tional evolutionary theory to explain and connect with clas-
sical ethology: A network is defined by interactions. The 
evolution of a network is the evolution of a complex whole. 
Fig. 1  A flowchart describing the algorithmic behavior of nest build-
ing, egg laying and provisioning in the sand wasp, Ammophila adri-
aansei. The main procedure begins with “start;” next to it appear the 
subroutines “New nest,” “Get caterpillar” and “Do next provisioning 
phase...;” and subroutine calls are denoted by rectangles with double 
vertical edges. Importantly, the entire apparatus is innate—it is hard-
wired—and must have evolved somehow. Learning is very limited, 
and is involved in the acquisition of local orientation but not in the 
behaviors in the flowchart (Lorenz 1981). For example, removing 
the larva and food after the wasp has already determined the amount 
of additional food to bring has no effect on its subsequent behavior, 
which proceeds like an automaton (Baerends 1941). Interspersed 
with the activities in the flowchart, the wasp may forage for herself 
or sleep (not shown). Note that the flowchart is only an approxima-
tion, albeit a close one, because of minor incomplete details in Baer-
ends’s (1941) description (such as whether the wasp builds two nests 




The conceptualization of evolution based on traditional the-
ory encouraged a one-trait-at-a-time type of thinking and 
was not suitable for discussing network evolution and the 
transfer of an element from one context to another (Gould 
and Vrba 1982; Gould 2002). Importantly, Tinbergen also 
noted that there is no point during emancipation at which a 
behavioral element stops belonging to its original function 
and starts belonging to a new function (Tinbergen 1952). 
Rather, as in the verbal model of network evolution dis-
cussed in Sect. 2.2, the change of context and meaning is 
gradual.
Let us now think about the evolution of a network such 
as described by Baerends. Obviously, elements were not 
added to it in the form in which they exist today. For exam-
ple, the construction of a well-shaped nest with a cell at the 
end had been preceded by a less involved modification of 
the environment. Also, elements were not appended in the 
course of evolution at the end of the behavioral sequence. 
That is, if “build nest”, “make closure,” “hunt caterpil-
lar,” etc., are denoted a, b, c, etc., then it is patently obvi-
ous that the stages of evolution did not proceed in the fol-
lowing sequence: a, ab, abc, etc., or else absurdities arise 
such as not laying eggs until a certain point in evolution, 
performing an inspection visit before the existence of a for-
aging stage where information from this visit is used, etc. 
This means that the behavioral sequence was reorganized in 
the course of evolution and/or new elements were added at 
internal positions in the sequence. It follows that elements 
that came after positions into which new or preexisting ele-
ments were inserted, or from which preexisting elements 
were removed or translocated, must have been emancipated 
from their previous triggers (namely the completion of the 
behavioral steps that used to come before them) and sub-
jected to new triggers (the completion of the behavioral 
steps that come before them now). Finally, we would not 
assume that each repeating element or subroutine evolved 
afresh in its entirety for each instance in the sequence in 
which it is used. This means that there has been a copy-
ing of routine calls, or, to use more generic terms, copying 
and differentiation of modules. Thus, operators of network 
evolution—emancipation, cooption, copying and differen-
tiation of modules—have been involved in the evolution of 
sand wasp behavior.
Another example showing the insertion of elements 
at internal points in a sequence and sequence reordering 
is Lorenz’s study of display sequences in surface feeding 
ducks (Lorenz 1958). Lorenz found about 20 behavioral 
elements, of which different combinations make different 
display sequences in different species and even within the 
same species. Lorenz (1958) describes the study of three 
different species, the mallard, the European teal (Anas 







6. Turn toward the female
7. Nod-swimming
8. Turning the back of the head
9. Bridling
10. Down-up movement
He then presents some display sequences (where one ele-
ment follows another in quick succession) for each of the 











(the semicolon mark between sequences 5,6 and 10,6 in the 
gadwall means that they are fused at high excitation, which 
suggests, by connection with many other observations, that 
we are observing them in the midst of a process of evolu-
tionary fusion; Lorenz 1958).
The sequences above are obligatory and innate. Hybrids 
produce their own sequences. This clearly shows network-
level evolution in the sense of reorganization of modules, 
emancipation and fusion at the level of sequences of fixed 
action patterns (FAPs).
Critically, this example and the previous ones show us 
that the picture that we obtain by looking closely at evolu-
tion at the phenotypic level mirrors what the molecular bio-
logical and genomic revolutions have taught us about the 
genetic level: at both the molecular and organismal levels, 
network-level evolution is key (Wagner and Lynch 2010; 
Lynch et al. 2011, 2015; Müller and Wagner 1991; Hallg-
rímsson et al. 2005; Müller 2007a; Moczek 2008; Schlosser 
2015). And network-level evolution is much better under-
stood with the help of the principles of interaction-based 




Fusion, like emancipation, is also a network-evolution 
operation. While Baerends’s and Lorenz’s examples above 
demonstrate it at the level of sequences of FAPs, fusion can 
also generate elements at a lower level, namely the level of 
the single FAP; though—again mirroring the genetic level 
(see discussion in Sect.  2.4)—there is no sharp boundary 
between the single FAP and sequences thereof. One tell-
ing example was the inciting ceremony in ducks (Lorenz 
1941/1971, 1958, 1966) described in Sect. 2.1: The move-
ments of threatening the neighbors with the neck and of 
returning to the mate, originally triggered by separate envi-
ronmental stimuli, have gradually fused over the course of 
evolution into a stationary neck-over-the-shoulder display 
triggered as one, while becoming emancipated from the 
presence of neighbors. These movements originally consti-
tuted territorial behavior, with an indirect, implied meaning 
of pair-bonding and team work; and as they fused, the pair-
bonding meaning crystallized and moved to the fore (Lor-
enz 1941/1971, 1958, 1966).
Many related examples exist. The tendency to attack 
a neighbor when in one’s own territory and flee from the 
neighbor when in the neighbor’s territory is indeed a very 
general one, spanning birds, fish and mammals. In some 
fish, the neighbors exchange chase and be-chased turns, 
coincident with crossing the territorial boundary (Lorenz 
1981). In the fire-mouth cyclid, Cichlasoma meeki, this 
chase and be-chased movement has become a highly rhyth-
mic oscillation—it has become stereotyped. The fusion of 
the previously separately triggered back-and-forth move-
ments in this species is revealed when one fish suddenly 
loses interest and disengages yet the other continues oscil-
lating (Lorenz 1981). Evolution, in this sense, is a process 
of automatization.
4.7  Generalizing Beyond Ritualization: The Automatic 
Nature of Instinct
The following examples not only show that fusion and other 
elements of network evolution extend beyond ritualization 
but also demonstrate the automatic nature of instinct. Con-
sider, for example, the pecking instinct in domestic chicks. 
This fixed action pattern (FAP) is present at birth and con-
sists of three main elements: lunging the head, opening and 
closing the beak, and swallowing (Lehrman 1953). Since 
we would not assume that these three elements of the fixed 
action pattern have each evolved from scratch in the context 
of this FAP, we are forced to assume that they have been 
fused.
The classic example of a FAP—egg rolling in the grey-
lag goose (Anser anser)—also shows fusion. Upon seeing 
an egg placed by the side of its nest, the goose stretches 
its neck in a particular fashion, places its beak over the 
egg, and then slowly rolls the egg back into the nest while 
performing balancing sideways motions with the beak 
to prevent the egg from slipping from the side (Lorenz 
and Tinbergen 1938/1970). This seems like an insightful 
sequence of operations, but in fact, when the egg is quickly 
pulled out from under the beak while in motion, the goose 
will continue to roll the remaining nothingness all the way 
to completion and tuck it under (Lorenz and Tinbergen 
1938/1970), again showing the automatic nature of instinct.
Indeed, it is implicit in Barlow’s definition of the FAP 
that the FAP is a fusion of elements in general (Barlow 
1977). Barlow defined the FAP (which he renamed “modal 
action pattern,” MAP) as a behavioral module usually 
indivisible but made of elements that appear individually 
elsewhere. It is quite informative that Lorenz (1958) had 
suggested that “perhaps all behavioral patterns” arise from 
fusion such as seen in the inciting example.
4.8  Ritualization Shows All Elements of Network 
Evolution in One
Interestingly, a single case of ritualization often exemplifies 
multiple or even all of the following characteristics: eman-
cipation (also: routinization, autonomization, or evolution 
of innateness), cooption, fusion (chunking, or welding), 
increased efficiency, exaggeration (or “caricaturization”), 
schematization, simplification, stereotypy, automatization 
and rigidification (Huxley 1914; Whitman 1919; Arm-
strong 1950; Tinbergen 1952). Traditional theory has only 
offered to explain one or another of these phenomena in 
separate from the others. For example, Maynard-Smith and 
Harper (2004) suggested that stereotypy evolves because it 
standardizes competition. This suggestion not only ignores 
the fact that stereotypy exists also in non-signaling instincts 
where such competition is absent, but also ignores the 
common co-occurrence of the many elements above-men-
tioned. In contrast, the principles discussed in this paper 
unify these observations under one umbrella, as outlined 
below:
–– Emancipation: Emancipation (the release of a module 
from previous influences), or the evolution of innate-
ness, is clearly demonstrated by the examples above, 
and has been addressed here as a part of interaction-
based (or network-based) evolution. The same is true for 
chunking—the fusion of modules—which is also a part 
of network-based evolution.
–– Simplification: A fundamental concept in ethology is 
that of the “sign stimulus”—the stimulus that elicits a 
FAP. “Sign” means “simple”: the sign stimulus obtained 
its name from the fact that the animal attends only to 
a very limited part of the situation that we know it to 
be capable of perceiving through its senses. It attends 
to a parsimonious summary of the situation—a key. 
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Yet the simplicity of the key is only relative: it is still 
a complex whole, a pattern involving relations between 
elements (Tinbergen and Kuenen 1939; Lorenz 1939; 
Krätzig 1940; Tinbergen 1951). For example, the gap-
ing response of nestling Turdus merula as soon as they 
open their eyes can be directed at a model consisting of 
a mere three discs that touch each other. However, it is 
preferentially directed toward one of the discs that bears 
the right size-relation to another disc, such that the 
two together can be interpreted as a simplified schema 
of head and body (Tinbergen and Kuenen 1939). As 
another example, an abstract cross-like model (includ-
ing symmetrical anterior and posterior “wing” edges, 
and central short and long protrusions perpendicular to 
them) elicited an escape response from young birds, but 
only when it was moved in the direction of the short end 
of the cross, as only in this case the short end can be 
interpreted as a short neck, which is the case for birds of 
prey (Lorenz 1939; Krätzig 1940; Tinbergen 1951). In 
other words, an abstract combination of elements is the 
evolved key. Now, Tinbergen argued that evolved ritu-
als, which are themselves stimuli eliciting behavior in 
others, have been “schematized” through evolution and 
are evolved sign stimuli (Tinbergen 1952). Thus, in ret-
rospect, his statement is consistent with the claim made 
here that rituals (and I will add the reception of signals, 
the “innate releasing mechanism,” or IRM; Lorenz 
1981) have been evolutionarily simplified under perfor-
mance pressure to their complex essence.
–– Exaggeration (or “caricaturization”): Ritualized sig-
nals are often exaggerated, as in the case of throwing 
the neck over one shoulder and then the other during 
inciting in the golden-eye (Sect.  2.1). Although it has 
been suggested that exaggeration has evolved under nat-
ural selection for visual clarity, one may ask whether 
organisms really need such a degree of clarity.20 I argue 
instead that exaggeration is related to “caricaturization” 
or “schematization” (terms used in the literature) and 
the final touch of perfection (Sect. 3.1), and evolves by 
active simplification under performance pressure 
(Sect. 3), not by minute economical considerations.
–– Stereotypy: Stereotypy—or the lack of variation 
between individuals in a certain trait, or even between 
different instances of the behavior in the same individ-
ual—is another prominent aspect of rituals. According 
to interaction-based evolution, stereotypy is an inherent 
aspect of evolution, as will be discussed in Sect. 4.10.
20 As an example of the animals’ acute discriminatory abilities, a 
herring gull can recognize its mate among a group of other gulls from 
30 yards away (Tinbergen 1951).
–– Cooption: Cooption is inherent to Tinbergen’s definition 
of ritualization, as noted (a non-signaling behavior is 
coopted as a signal) and is also a crucial part of interac-
tion-based evolution.
Thus, interaction-based evolution provides a more parsi-
monious view of ritualization than traditional theory. This 
provides both additional support for interaction-based 
evolution and an improved conceptual understanding of 
ritualization.
4.9  Recapitulation: Network Evolution and Phenotypes
In the model of network evolution (Sect.  2.2), I argued 
that two genetic elements that previously were regulated 
by two separate lines of controls and had to be separately 
expressed before coming together in an interaction can, 
over evolutionary time, gradually come together under one 
control and even fuse to form a new gene. In this process, 
there is not only emancipation (since one or both of these 
elements is emancipated from what previously controlled 
it) but also a sense of automatization, innateness and accel-
eration, as the emerging unit is no longer constructed from 
its elements by developmental interactions but rather has 
been evolutionarily accelerated into a ready-made unit or 
gene. We can now see that, like the genetic-level examples, 
the organismal-level examples that demonstrate emancipa-
tion and cooption also demonstrate the evolution of innate-
ness, automatization, and acceleration, as expected. In the 
pecking instinct of domestic chicks, for instance, the lung-
ing of the head, the opening and closing of the beak, and 
the swallowing, have been fused together. Therefore, the 
last two elements follow the first one automatically now, 
even though they must have been originally triggered 
separately by the environment. Furthermore, this welded 
instinct appears soon after hatching, and perhaps even in 
the embryo to some degree (Lehrman 1953; Kuo 1932a, b), 
demonstrating the evolution of innateness and acceleration. 
Similar points can be made, for example, about egg roll-
ing in the greylag goose or the inciting ceremony in ducks 
(Sect. 2.1).
4.10  Stereotypy and the Evolution of Complex 
Phenotypes: The Process by Which Phenotypes 
Become Fixed
Interaction-based evolution argues that selection evaluates 
individuals as complex wholes (Livnat 2013). Unlike selec-
tion on additive variance (Fisher 1930), it argues that 
genetic interactions are at the core of the adaptive evolu-
tionary process. Unlike the shifting balance theory (Wright 
1931, 1932), it argues that genetic interactions are not 
formed by random genetic drift but rather transient genetic 
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combinations are continually subject to selection. This kind 
of process has not yet been modeled mathematically. How-
ever, Livnat (2013) has made the following verbal argu-
ment regarding it. If selection acts on transient, complex 
combinations of interacting alleles across loci, then the 
information relevant for adaptive evolution under selection 
must be non-local: adaptive phenotypic change does not 
appear first in one individual and then spread to all, but 
rather forms at the population level through the concomi-
tant spread under selection of many interacting alleles 
across loci (Livnat 2013). As some alleles spread in the 
population to fixation, the phenotypic variation that used to 
be caused by the sexual shuffling of these alleles must also 
gradually disappear, and thus, with regards to this varia-
tion, individuals must gradually become more similar to 
each other over the generations (Livnat 2013). This implies 
that stabilization accompanies the evolution of adaptation 
in general, rather than requires a separate force for stabili-
zation of a trait per se, implemented by accidental mutation 
and natural selection21 (Stearns 2002). I called this effect 
“convergence” at the population level (Livnat 2013) (note 
that this usage of the term is distinct from the usual mean-
ing of convergence in evolution).
If this is correct, then we should see a continuum of phe-
notypic fixedness corresponding to the formation of traits, 
with different traits lying at present at different points along 
that continuum. Some traits, still early in the process of for-
mation, will appear as less stable or stereotyped, and oth-
ers, at later stages in the process, will appear as more so. 
Thus, under interaction-based evolution, stereotypy can be 
seen as an indication of the degree of evolutionary progress 
of a trait.
An example is provided again by the pointers. Darwin 
wrote that the hunting behaviors that characterize the point-
ers are basically innate, and that the only difference between 
them and “true instinct” is that they are “less strictly inher-
ited” in that there is variation in the individuals’ “degree of 
inborn perfection” and therefore in the extent to which they 
require training (Romains 1883,  p. 237). Indeed, point-
ing in a statuesque manner, backing other dogs and other 
hunting-relevant behaviors have all been observed to occur 
often in pups that have not had the opportunity for learn-
ing by instruction, imitation or experience, and they are 
not exhibited immediately or to the same degree in all pups 
21 Note that the argument is that of implication: If selection on tran-
sient, complex combinations of alleles across loci is at the core of the 
adaptive evolutionary process, then stabilization must accompany 
adaptation. This does not tell us the details of how stabilization hap-
pens, which interaction-based evolution argues relate to non-acciden-
tal mutations and innateness as discussed in Sects. 2 and 2.3. While 
Siegal and Bergman (2002) offered a related view, their view does not 
consider the nature of mutation.
(Arkwright 1902). When training is required, the amount 
of training required is small: the trainer only guides the dog 
toward expressing what it already has a strong natural ten-
dency to express (Arkwright 1902). The existence of vari-
ation in pointing behavior becomes natural from the per-
spective of interaction-based evolution: if traits evolve from 
fuzzy to sharp, if they are gradually stabilized, as discussed 
by Livnat (2013), then this simply means that pointing is 
still in the process of formation and has not yet become 
perfectly innate.
In light of the above, interaction-based evolution pro-
vides a distinctly different view than the traditional one on 
the evolution of stereotypy. Those who previously tried to 
explain stereotypy argued that signals must be clear, that 
stereotypy makes them clearer, and that they are selected 
for this extra clarity in a traditional process of selection 
(Mayr 1974; Barlow 1977).22 However, I argue, first, that 
the clarity-based approach lacked parsimony from the 
beginning, because stereotypy is a property of instinct in 
general, not just of signaling behavior specifically; and sec-
ond, that the clarity-based approach is unnecessary: the 
degree of uniformity is an outcome of the temporal nature 
of the process. This degree is in general associated with the 
point that the trait has reached along the spectrum of for-
mation, and we observe that it varies across traits because 
we are witnessing traits at different stages of formation. 
Even if uniformity per se can be of value, the traditional 
focus on uniformity as a separate end obscures the general 
point: stabilization is not in and of itself a separate target of 
selection as traditionally perceived; it is an inherent part of 
interaction-based evolution.23
Hinde’s comparative study of displays in finches dem-
onstrates several of the points above (Hinde 1955). First, 
the same trait may vary more or be more stereotyped in 
one species than another. Second, demonstrating the evolu-
tion of FAPs from interactions, most displays in the finches 
22 Accordingly, when Barlow noted that even what were previously 
called FAPs are not uniformly fixed, but rather some FAPs vary more 
than others (Barlow 1977), he tried to explain this continuum by 
arguing that signals that need to be clearer are more stereotyped, and 
others are less so (Barlow 1977).
23 This is not to say that all traits must inevitably cover the whole 
spectrum and reach the extreme, nor that they all move along the 
spectrum at the same rate; but it is to say that the degree of fixedness 
comes from the nature of the process of network-based evolution, and 
is not an independent element traditionally selected for, as Maynard-
Smith and Harper (2004) and Mayr (1974) have argued. Indeed, 
whether the evolving trait is a signal or not, the evolutionary process 
is converging on an adaptation: along with the decrease in variance 
and disorder, it converges on highly efficient structure and behavior. 
Clarity, which is part of the effectiveness of the signal, and efficiency 
in other adaptations, are outcomes of the evolutionary process, and 
uniformity is an inherent concomitant of the process in both cases.
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studied by Hinde are not yet fixed action patterns but rather 
are poses whose elements tend to occur together statisti-
cally. Third, of the different displays, the one which is par-
ticularly rigid, stereotyped and emancipated (the female 
soliciting posture), is also the one that is far more widely 
shared, and therefore more ancient, than the other, still var-
iable displays, in accord with the prediction above that ste-
reotypy is indicative of the evolutionary stage of formation 
of a trait. Another, in-depth example showing the evolution 
of different degrees of fixedness, and that stereotypy is a 
concomitant of the evolution of adaptation—the evolution 
of decoy-nest construction in sand wasps—will be given in 
Sect. 4.12.
4.11  Interaction‑Based Evolution Provides a Single 
Explanation to the Different Aspects of Innateness
“Innate behavior” or “instinct” has been used to mean dif-
ferent things in the literature (Papaj 1993):
1. Independence: It has been used to refer to behavior that 
is independent of interactions with the external envi-
ronment like learning or experience. Such independ-
ence is especially clear when a behavior is present from 
birth, as for example in the pecking of domestic chicks 
(Lehrman 1953).24
2. Stereotypy: Innate behavior has been referred to as ste-
reotyped (also, “fixed,” “constant,” “rigid” —“robotic;” 
Papaj 1993).
3. Sharedness: Innate behaviors have been found to be 
homologizable between species and therefore useful 
for taxonomy. In other words, they are shared between 
species, with some species-specific characteristics 
(Lorenz 1981; Heinroth 1911; Whitman 1898, 1919).
24 “Environment” and “experience” need to be qualified: No behavior 
is entirely independent from the “environment” or from “experience” 
when these notions are so broadly construed as to include such fac-
tors as the flow of food materials during development or the “source 
of experience” that one body tissue provides a neighboring one in the 
course of development. Even what we more normally call “experi-
ence,” that is interaction with the outside during growth and learn-
ing, can figure into and change aspects of behaviors that are otherwise 
innate. For example, the tendency of the rat to build a nest is innate, 
yet it will not be able to carry it out if it is deprived of experiencing 
the carrying and manipulating of objects during development (Lehr-
man 1953). Despite this important qualification, the conceptualization 
of innateness as independence from the environment is still true and 
useful in an important sense.
The fact that these three aspects are connected empirically 
is clear.25 But why are they connected? Tinbergen’s tone 
regarding the empirical connection between points 2 and 3 
above was that of surprise (Tinbergen 1951, p.191). Barlow 
discussed stereotypy in the context of the clarity of signals 
(Barlow 1977), which neither addresses stereotypy in non-
signaling behavior nor explains the connection between ste-
reotypy and independence. And Papaj’s model was unable 
to connect stereotypy and independence (Papaj 1993).
However, interaction-based evolution connects the dif-
ferent aspects of innateness. First, traits evolve by a pro-
cess of convergence as defined (see Sect.  4.10; Livnat, 
2013)—a process of stabilization which begins at a state of 
high variance and eventually leads to the evolution of uni-
formity and therefore stereotypy (Livnat 2013). Since this 
process takes time, it makes it so that stereotyped elements 
are older and more widely shared than elements not yet 
stereotyped, while implying that stereotypy evolves across 
related species in parallel. This point connects the sharing 
of a trait between species with stereotypy (aspects 3 and 2 
above, respectively).
Second, I have argued that interaction-based evolution 
works in the long-term through simplification under perfor-
mance pressure. This can not only make one intra-organis-
mal module independent of another, but also make it inde-
pendent of environmental factors (see Sect. 4.2). Therefore, 
the process of interaction-based evolution leads not only to 
stereotypy but also to increased independence from envi-
ronmental factors (1). This ties together independence, phy-
logenetic sharedness and stereotypy.
Interaction-based evolution also explains two other 
important aspects of innateness. One is that the fixed action 
pattern (FAP) often and perhaps always consists of fused 
elements (Lorenz 1958) (see Sects. 4.6, 4.7), which aligns 
with the fact that fusion is an outcome of network-level 
evolution. The other is the issue of circuitous vs. accel-
erated development, which will be discussed later (see 
Sect. 4.14), and which will clarify the connection between 
evolution and learning.
25 First, both Tinbergen and Lorenz considered it of great impor-
tance that stereotyped behavior (fixed action pattern; point 2 above) 
is also homologizable between species and therefore is as useful for 
taxonomy as morphological characters are (point 3) (Tinbergen 1951; 
Lorenz 1981) (Lorenz called it “an epoch making discovery;” Lorenz 
1981, p. 103). Second, there is an agreement that, empirically, what is 
innate in the first sense above (1)—what is automatic—appears also 
to be stereotyped, or “fixed;” it appears “robotic” (2) (Barlow 1977; 
Papaj 1993). Indeed, Barlow’s continuum of FAPs runs both from 
variable to stereotyped and from dependent on to independent of the 
environment at the same time (Barlow 1977).
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4.12  Evolution from Fuzzy to Sharp: Examples 
of the Evolution of Complex Phenotypes
In this paper, we have seen that examples of the evolution 
of complex phenotypes fit with the view of interaction-
based evolution: they demonstrate cooption and emancipa-
tion, stabilization and stereotypy, and evolution from fuzzy 
to sharp. But perhaps most intriguingly, they speak to the 
arising of novelty in a way that is consistent with network-
level evolution.
I will first discuss in detail the example of decoy con-
struction in sand wasps, taken from Evans’s classic etho-
logical work (Evans 1966a, b). Readers who wish to skip 
this example may continue directly to the final and most 
important organismal level example to be discussed here—
that of egg retrieval by backward walking in the nightjar 
(Sect. 4.13)—where I will demonstrate all the elements dis-
cussed in this paper in one, with an emphasis on the central 
point of novelty.
To make a nest, the Bembicinae (previously called Nys-
soninae) sand wasps dig a tunnel of many body-lengths, at 
the end of which they build a cell or a complex of cells, 
where they place their offspring and the prey on which the 
offspring will feed (Evans 1966b). They have natural ene-
mies—two taxonomic groups of flies (the bee flies, Bomb-
yliidae, and miltogrammine flies, Sarcophagidae) and two 
taxonomic groups of parasitic wasps (the cuckoo wasps, 
Chrysididae, and “velvet ants,” Mutillidae)— that parasitize 
their nests by laying there, and whose larvae either takes up 
valuable resources or destroy the larvae of the sand wasp. 
Parasites of the former two groups seek the nests of their 
hosts by sight, and of the latter two groups by touch and 
odor—they tap the soil with their antennae while searching 
for their target (Evans 1966b). Across the sand wasps we 
find various techniques of hiding and concealment as well 
as a decoy construction technique (Evans 1966b).
Our example concerns the decoy construction: Some 
species of sand wasp dig a false burrow (or multiple such 
burrows) next to the real one and leave it (or them) open, 
while leaving the real nest burrow closed. Various parasites 
have been observed to either lay their eggs or linger in the 
decoys. Evans hypothesized that false burrows originated in 
a behavior that had a different purpose—that its origin is in 
cooption—and that the process of the evolution of digging 
false burrows was a process of improvement through stere-
otypy, together with emancipation (see also Tsuneki 1963).
He based his hypothesis on the following facts. Very 
commonly across the Bembicinae, the wasps close the 
entrance to their nest from the outside before leaving it, 
either temporarily with a small amount of soil before leav-
ing temporarily for provisioning, or with a large amount of 
soil at the final closure before leaving for good; and both 
within and outside of the Bembicinae, species have been 
observed where individuals obtain soil for nest closure 
mostly from several or one particular spot/s around the 
entrance. In this case they leave behind a small pit or pits 
of a size that depends on how much a particular spot was 
used. The tendency to take soil from a particular spot or 
spots appears to relate to environmental conditions, where 
individuals quarry soil for closure when loose soil is not 
as easily available (Evans 1966a), though it also has a 
genetic component (Evans 1966a). The more soil is quar-
ried from a particular spot, the bigger the pit left behind. In 
Bembecinus neglectus, for example, most individuals took 
the soil for closure from several particular spots around 
the entrance, so that a ring of small depressions was left 
behind. But some took it mostly from one particular spot, 
which formed a “depression or short “false burrow” up to 1 
cm deep” (Evans 1966b, p. 137).
Now, in the genus Bembix, which typifies the advanced 
behaviors of the Bembicinae, we see species with decided 
false burrows. Consider three species: Bembix amoena, 
B. texana and B. sayi. In B. amoena, false burrows are of 
irregular occurrence and spatial pattern and are relatively 
short, and the burrowing is still almost always associated 
with quarrying soil for closure. Most individuals obtain soil 
for the initial closure by scraping a small amount of soil 
from each side of the nest entrance, and occasionally from 
a particular spot or spots, creating short false burrows that 
stretch in a direction of 90 degrees or a bit less left or right 
of the direction of the true nest, obliquely into the ground. 
These short false side burrows varied in length from barely 
perceptible to 2 cm long, with two exceptional cases 
observed at 3 and 5 cm long (Evans 1966b). Evans (1966b) 
noted that, in one population, about half of the nests had no 
such false side burrows, about a quarter had one, and the 
rest had two such false side burrows at one time or another. 
In addition, individuals also collected soil from opposite of 
the nest entrance, most often, but not always, for the final 
closure (which requires more soil), which resulted either 
in a furrow going through the mound of soil opposite the 
true nest (a mound resulting from the excavation of the true 
nest), or in a burrow running under that mound obliquely 
through the ground. The former appeared a considerable 
number of times, (Evans 1966b, p. 280) and were of vary-
ing length, between 1 and 7 cm long. The latter appeared 
rarely (Evans 1966b), with only three cases noted, at 1.5, 
2 and 3 cm long. Evans (1966b, p. 281) noted that two of 
these were made following final closure in a manner similar 
to that of Bembix sayi (see below), which seems to suggest 
that these two rare instances occurred not in the service of 
obtaining soil for closure.
Besides the burrows themselves, the manner and timing 
of construction of the burrows was also variable of course 
(Evans 1966a, b). The burrows on the sides, when they 
occurred, occurred sometimes along with the initial closure 
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and sometimes along with later closures. The back burrows 
and furrows, when they appeared, appeared often along 
with the final closure but sometimes along with earlier clo-
sures, and the final closure did not always involve them. 
While burrows were sometimes revisited and expanded, 
they were sometimes accidentally filled while making a 
closure. Likewise, the spatial pattern resulting at the end 
was variable, with 0 or 1 or 2 side burrows and 0 or 1 back 
burrow or furrow (Evans 1966a, b). Note that, although the 
soil was generally taken for closures, parasites were dis-
tracted by the false burrows that resulted (Evans 1966a).
In B. texana, construction of false burrows is more 
or less regular, and the soil is not used for closure. Typi-
cally, individuals construct one short but relatively persis-
tent false burrow on each side of the entrance, right after 
the initial closure is made (Evans 1966b). The method of 
construction is not yet entirely stereotyped, with some indi-
viduals digging one burrow and then the other, and others 
alternating in digging both (Evans 1966b, p. 325).
In B. sayi, construction is invariable and emancipated: 
all females dig one strong back burrow 4–22 cm long under 
the mound after completion of final closure (which also 
means that the soil is not used for closure) (Evans 1966b, 
a).
The three species above exemplify certain general 
trends (Evans 1966b, a). The primitive cases of false bur-
rows, where the burrow is but a small pit, are unreliable 
and irregular in appearance. The “transitional” case of B. 
amoena shows burrows appearing in a notable number of 
cases but still rather irregularly. They are often longer than 
“small pits” but are still relatively short and vary greatly 
in length. In the advanced cases, the burrows appear with 
greater regularity and are substantial. In B. sayi, which 
makes the longest burrows, the burrows appear invariably 
in all individuals and at a regular time. There is an asso-
ciation between stereotypy and completeness of the burrow 
(Evans 1966a, b).
In addition, there is an association between stereotypy 
and emancipation of burrow-making from its previous 
cause (Evans 1966b, a). That is, limited quarrying in the 
service of obtaining soil for closure is a widespread phe-
nomenon, and tends to be irregular in occurrence; whereas, 
in contrast, regular burrows are the result of burrowing 
for its own sake, an operation not used for closure, and 
are constructed at regular times before or after closure, 
depending on the particular species concerned. In some of 
the advanced species where burrow-making is thus eman-
cipated, the wasps refresh or fix burrows that have been 
destroyed (Tsuneki 1963), which further clarifies that they 
are programmed to maintain a certain pattern of false bur-
rows. The above characteristics are also associated with 
increased regularity of the spatial pattern of the burrows, 
with each of the different emancipated species having its 
own idiosyncratic characteristics of construction (Evans 
1966b, a).
Furthermore, not only have emancipated burrows never 
been observed in species that lack closures, but in addition, 
a careful examination of the data in Evans (1966b) shows 
that, even though they are no longer used for closure, eman-
cipated back burrows are temporally associated with final 
closures, and emancipated side burrows are temporally 
associated with initial closures, which supports the fact that 
the origin of emancipated burrows is in closure-making.
Thus, evidence clearly supports the predictions of inter-
action-based evolution. The evolution of false burrows 
originated in cooption—in emerging high-level interac-
tions between preevolved elements like digging, quarrying 
and making closures, and environmental elements like sand 
conditions. That starting state was one of high variance 
in behavior and outcome within and between individuals. 
Evolution then proceeded from fuzzy to sharp: through a 
process of convergence and gradual stabilization of the trait 
as a whole toward a stable, emancipated and clock-work-
like state. The process was one of improvement together 
with and at the same time as stereotypy and emancipa-
tion. Note that it is not the case that complete but irregu-
lar burrows evolved first, and then were stabilized. That 
is, stereotypy, or uniformity, is not an outcome of a force 
of stabilizing selection separate from the selection for the 
adaptation itself. Rather, stabilization and improvement 
evolve together as two aspects of the same coin—as inher-
ent concomitants of the adaptive evolution of the whole as 
a whole, as predicted by interaction-based evolution.
4.13  The Emergence of Novelty in the Evolution of Egg 
Retrieval by Backward Walking
I will now discuss the final and most important organismal-
level example that puts all of the elements of the theory dis-
cussed here together, while emphasizing the central point 
of the emergence of novelty. This is the example of the evo-
lution of egg retrieval by backward walking in the nightjar 
(Caprimulgus europaeus) and other species, which applies 
to eggs that have rolled far outside the nest. Before we can 
understand it, we must first see what the shifting motion in 
birds is.
The shifting motion in birds is ancient and involves roll-
ing an egg with the beak until it reaches under the body. 
The egg may have thus gotten in between other eggs and 
stirred them, and the egg sides that are pointing up are 
thus changed (Tinbergen 1960). Shifting may be needed 
to ensure even temperature distribution to the eggs (Cald-
well and Cornwell 1975), and is performed upon arrival at 
the nest, or when the tactile stimulus provided by the eggs 
while brooding is not satisfying, or spontaneously after a 
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long spell of quiet brooding (Tinbergen 1960). In terns, the 
shifting motion will move an egg about 2–3 inches.
Coming back to our case of egg retrieval, in terns (e.g., 
Onychoprion fuscatus), the general situation is as follows 
(Watson and Lashley 1915; Tinbergen 1960): If they notice 
an egg lying several inches outside of the nest, they leave 
the nest right away to it. However, they have an aversion 
toward being far from the nest, induced by their brood-
ing state, and as they move away from the nest, they slow 
down, sometimes turning around and returning to the nest 
without having reached the external egg. But sometimes 
they do get to the egg, stopping short of it just close enough 
that they can reach it with the beak and apply the shifting 
motion to it, which rolls the egg until it is under the breast.
As they shift the egg, they sit down on it to incubate it, 
but only for a short time (indeed they may at this point be 
dissatisfied with the tactile stimulus and/or with being out-
side of the nest). The moment they notice the nest again 
they stand up and walk to it. In the process, the egg has 
moved about 2–3 inches toward the nest due to the shifting 
motion.
Having returned to the nest and started brooding the 
eggs there, they soon notice the external egg again, ven-
ture out toward it again, and repeat the process, and the egg 
moves 2–3 inches again toward the nest. Thus, after several 
trips, the egg finds its way back to the nest.
The behavior that results in the egg being moved back 
to the nest is clearly unstructured. The brooding of the 
external egg outside of the nest and the back-and-forth 
trips show lack of insight or “analysis of the situation as 
a whole” (Watson and Lashley 1915, p. 83), as the differ-
ent actions taken in the situation are under the proximate 
control of different preevolved instincts. In accordance with 
Tinbergen (1960), these instincts are competing with each 
other for expression: the desire not to leave the nest, the 
desire to return to the nest, the desire to brood eggs, and the 
desire and ability to shift an egg. Also, as Marshall noted 
for the common tern (Sterna hirundo) (Marshall 1943), 
there is much variance in the behavior and its outcome, 
with eggs sometimes being rolled back into the nest and 
sometimes not, and this variance is thought to reflect both 
individual variance and situational factors (Marshall 1943).
In other birds, however, such as greylag geese (Anser 
anser), black-headed gulls (Chroicocephalus ridibundus) 
and nightjars, the bird walks straight up to the egg, puts the 
beak over it as it would in shifting, but instead of incubat-
ing the egg there, it then walks backwards all the way to the 
nest in one shot while shifting and dragging the egg under 
its beak (Kirkman 1937; Tinbergen 1960).
According to Tinbergen, this egg rolling observed in 
nightjars and other birds evolved from shifting and other 
elements of the situation (Tinbergen 1960). Indeed, the fact 
that the birds are using a shifting motion while walking 
backward (even though rolling with the wing would have 
been much more efficient) together with the fact that shift-
ing is ancient, supports this hypothesis (Tinbergen 1960). 
In fact, Tinbergen notes that the very controversy about 
whether egg retrieval is an independent adaptation or a 
by-product of a confluence of instincts in different species 
shows its route of evolution (Tinbergen 1960).
The argument that this backward walking behavior 
appearing in nightjars and other birds evolved from a situ-
ation akin to that of the terns exemplifies several elements 
of interaction-based evolution in one: The trait has evolved 
from fuzzy to sharp; from unstructured and inefficient to 
structured and efficient; from variable and unstable to sta-
ble, stereotyped and “rigorous.” In addition, we also see 
emancipation in it: the return back to the nest originally 
required the visual stimulus of seeing the nest, but now 
is triggered automatically as soon as the shifting motion 
begins and requires no turning-around to the nest. We also 
see fusion: the going-to-the-egg and the coming-back-
to-the-nest legs have been fused together in one sequence 
unleashed by the stimulus of seeing the external egg for the 
first time, whereas previously they were two separate legs 
each triggered by its own visual stimulus. The whole situa-
tion has been simplified, the path has been straightened up. 
In fact, the simplification has been the creation of a method 
from a previously non-methodical occurrence, when all the 
while the whole evolved as a whole, not by the addition of 
independent elements one at a time.
On top of all of the above, one topic deserves a spe-
cial emphasis: novelty. The example of egg rolling shows 
clearly that different instincts or elements have the inherent 
ability to come together into new, useful interactions that 
together can achieve what had been unachievable before 
by any one of those instincts alone. Twice we see that this 
coming together of pre-evolved elements into useful, high-
level interactions breaks a barrier in terms of being able to 
do something that could not have been done before. First, 
the confluence of instincts for shifting, brooding and return-
ing to the nest effectively allows the egg to be returned 
to the nest after several trips, even if in a haphazard way, 
when none of these instincts by itself is capable of achiev-
ing this, nor did any of them originate due to pressure for 
such egg retrieval. The second barrier broken was this: 
the invention of backward walking while shifting allows 
retrieval of the egg in time that is proportional simply to 
the distance to the egg, whereas the haphazard way only 
allows retrieval in time that is quadratic in distance. This 
improvement allows nightjars to retrieve eggs from many 
yards away, which would not have been effectively possible 
in the case of terns (indeed terns retrieve eggs from only 
several inches away). Thus, emancipation and fusion have 
created a behavior that now applies to a broader range of 
situations than the ancestral traits applied to. Indeed, some 
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of these birds now dwell in beaches where eggs can indeed 
be blown away by wind a great distance.
These breakings of barriers exemplify novelty. The 
source of the novelty is the inherent ability of elements to 
come together into new and useful high-level interactions. 
These elements come together first in a haphazard state. 
Their complex interaction then serves as a substrate for 
simplification under performance pressure, where new such 
elements will be formed. I propose that this cycle is the 
heart of the evolutionary process; and that it is simplifica-
tion under performance pressure that is responsible for this 
inherent usefulness of elements—for their propensity to 
come together into new, useful interactions that they have 
not been directly selected for.
While consistent with previous works on the evolution 
of novelty, as will be discussed in Sect. 4.16, this point pro-
vides an understanding of novelty in evolution that is com-
pletely different from and not reducible to the traditional 
notion of accidental mutation and natural selection. The 
novelty that drives evolution here arises from the coming 
together of high-level “modules,” i.e., from the network 
as a whole. It is not a local, “misspelling”-like change at 
the genetic level. This demonstrates the key point that the 
source of invention in evolution does not need to be acci-
dental mutation. Instead, I argue that non-accidental muta-
tion and natural selection together process information 
gradually, and the source of novelty in evolution is the 
resulting inherent ability of elements to come together in 
useful high-level interactions, an ability due to simplifica-
tion under performance pressure.
Watson and Lashley (1915) saw that the outcome of the 
haphazard mode of egg retrieval was not intentional. They 
noted that the egg rolls in the direction of the nest simply 
because the bird is oriented directly away from the nest 
as it reaches the egg, so that the shifting motion happens 
to bring the egg a bit closer to the nest each time. From 
this they concluded that the egg finds its way to the nest 
by lucky happenstance. But this lucky happenstance is a far 
cry from the traditional notion of novelty in random muta-
tion. First, it is not a local accidental mutation that invents, 
but rather the process starts with high-level interactions, 
and gradual network evolution creates a new trait from 
this source. Second, a deep new question arises. Should 
we call this source of novelty “randomness” or “lucky 
happenstance” at the phenotypic level, and say no more? 
There is logic to the present situation that goes beyond the 
purely coincidental. That is, although the egg rolls to the 
nest only because of the bird’s orientation, it is oriented in 
this way because it is walking straight up to the egg from 
the nest. Each action—walking straight up, shifting and 
returning—is efficient and elegant, and together they cre-
ate a situation that, while haphazard, is not purely random, 
but can be seen as a fuzzy sort of “shifting in an extended 
nest.” Thus, a confluence of instincts, each useful in and of 
itself, together give rise to something useful that is different 
from each of them, but which at first can only appear in a 
roundabout, highly variable, even though not purely acci-
dental, fashion. As such, it serves as material for evolution-
ary simplification and streamlining, which ends up creating 
something that can be useful in contexts that go beyond the 
one that originated it.
It is intriguing that an unqualified notion of the acci-
dental does not sufficiently explain novelty here. When we 
apply this way of thinking to other cases of cooption, we 
will see that, individually, they may appear more or less 
accidental than the above case; but they are not, in gen-
eral, “pure coincidences.” This, together with the question 
of how exactly simplification under performance pres-
sure leads to inherently useful elements, contributes a new 
dimension to the science of novelty (Gould and Vrba 1982; 
Müller 1990; Müller and Wagner 1991; Gould 2002; Moc-
zek 2008; Wagner 2014).
While others have discussed the possibility of cooption 
being a source of novelty (Gould and Vrba 1982; Hall-
grímsson et  al. 2012; Müller 1990; Müller and Wagner 
1991; Schlichting and Pigliucci 1998; West-Eberhard 2003; 
Müller and Newman 2005; Moczek 2008; Peterson and 
Müller 2013), this possibility has not been sufficiently dis-
tinguished from the view of accidental mutation—cooption 
has often been treated as an accidental event and another 
source of novelty in addition to accidental mutation (Wil-
liams 1966; Gould and Vrba 1982; Gould 2002). In con-
trast, interaction-based evolution argues that cooption is 
neither an accidental event nor another source of novelty 
in addition to accidental mutation. Rather, the joint action 
of non-accidental mutation and natural selection gradu-
ally paves the way to both genetic and phenotypic coop-
tion through network-level evolution. Thus, neither muta-
tion nor cooption are random in the traditional sense even 
though they produce surprising things, and they are not 
separate sources of novelty but come together as two insep-
arable aspects of one process. In other words, cooption is at 
the heart of the process of interaction-based evolution and 
is built into this process.
Thus, while in the traditional view, new genetic informa-
tion arises by accident at a specific point in space and time, 
according to interaction-based evolution, novelty is an out-
come that arises over time at the network level from the 
coevolutionary change of many elements. While the drivers 
of these local changes are not random, these changes still 
interact with each other globally in a surprising way. Sur-
prise, or novelty, exists, but it is not a mere direct effect of 
dice rolling.
It is noteworthy that the tern situation is based on con-
flict, or competition between tendencies. The bird, on the 
one hand, acts as though it wants to reach up to the egg 
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and incubate it, but on the other hand as though it wants 
to remain in the nest. It is also noteworthy that there is 
individual variation in the overall behavior, and indeed, 
there may be different ways of increasing the probability 
of success. One way may be to approach the egg without 
hesitation. Another may be to get back to the nest without 
delay once the egg has been shifted. There is an inherent 
conflict in the situation. Both tendencies have something 
to contribute, but they are conflicting. To strengthen one 
at the expense of the other may be harmful. One may sup-
pose that evolution needs to take a modest though complex 
step: to find a solution for returning to the nest immediately 
and only after reaching the egg while engaging it with the 
beak. This can be achieved, for example, by overcoming 
the tendency to incubate but only while standing outside of 
the nest. The relevant rule to evolve, “incubate in the pres-
ence of eggs AND when standing in the nest” is simple but 
non-linear. In performing this evolutionary step, the con-
vergence process described by Livnat (2013) may lead to 
the crystallization of the commonality between successful 
individuals while resolving the conflict inherent in the situ-
ation, making evolution a process of conflict resolution.
The example also shows us, of course, that the whole 
is greater than the sum of its parts and that the organism 
evolves as a whole. Conceptualizing evolution in this way 
provides an answer to the many inconsistencies that arise 
from the accidental mutation framework and the related 
conceptualization of evolution as a one-step-at-a-time type 
of process, such as the fact that the latter often lead us to 
surmise difficult evolutionary transitions leading to com-
plex adaptations where the intervening steps are not adap-
tive in and of themselves (Wright 1931, 1932; see also 
Moczek 2008; Hallgrímsson et  al. 2012; Arnold 2003; 
Müller and Newman 2005; Peterson and Müller 2013; Kaji 
et al. 2016).
Finally, a connection similar to the one pointed out 
between punctualism and gradualism in morphological 
evolution (Müller and Streicher 1989; Müller and Wag-
ner 1991; Moczek 2008; Hallgrímsson et  al. 2012; Peter-
son and Müller 2013) can be seen in the above behavioral 
example. Suppose that, as the underlying instincts evolve 
and are being emancipated and adjusted, the balance of ten-
dencies gradually changes such that the tendency to incu-
bate the external egg while outside of the nest falls below 
the tendency to return to the nest, while the tendency to 
return remains balanced with shifting, so that returning and 
shifting are expressed together. In that case, these tenden-
cies may evolve gradually, while the new trait may arise 
punctually: it may be possible for a bird species to evolve 
backward-walking retrieval as a whole and rather rapidly, 
causing an evolutionary “phase transition” at the level 
of the observed behavior. Backward walking will then 
appear first in one individual, then in another, then more 
and more—it will arrive “like the rain.” Thus, punctualism 
is better understood when we start thinking of it in terms 
of network evolution, as an outcome of gradual network-
change trends that interact with each other (Müller and 
Wagner 1991; Moczek 2008; Hallgrímsson et  al. 2012; 
Peterson and Müller 2013).
4.14  How Evolution Learns: Circuitous Versus 
Accelerated Development
The example of the evolution of egg retrieval highlights 
a fifth aspect of innateness. The terns are not learning to 
retrieve the egg, yet their haphazard emergent behavior 
which results in egg retrieval does not seem to fit the term 
“innate.” There is another aspect to innateness, and that is 
the degree to which a behavior develops straightforwardly 
and quickly in an endogenously driven fashion. For exam-
ple, though an emerged butterfly takes to the air after it fin-
ishes preparations (like drying up its wings), this behavior 
of taking off is not actually driven but only triggered by fin-
ishing preparations, and is otherwise endogenously driven. 
In contrast, the behavior which results in egg retrieval in 
the terns arises circuitously and at a high level, from a 
meeting of different inborn behavioral elements as well as 
environmental factors which play a more inherent role in 
inducing the behavior: the visual stimuli and conflicting 
instincts do cause the retrieval of the egg. This high level 
meeting of modules, both internal and external, now serves 
as the source of evolution from fuzzy to sharp, at the end 
of which a new innate module, consisting of a combina-
tion of the previously independent elements, will arise (that 
of backward walking). This aspect, namely, how quickly, 
straightforwardly and endogenously a behavior (or a trait in 
general, including morphological traits) arises in develop-
ment is important for evolutionary acceleration: In the ini-
tial circuity there is a potential for “straightening up,” there 
is a potential for simplification that will lead to the further 
breaking of barriers (e.g., substantially faster egg retrieval). 
The environmental factors play a more inherent role in 
inducing the behavioral outcome in the tern situation than 
in the butterfly situation, which means that, in becoming 
emancipated from them in the course of evolution, the life 
form is “learning” from the environment evolutionarily. 
That is, it now produces more endogenously what the envi-
ronment helped to produce before. I argue that this eman-
cipation is the intergenerational “learning” that is done by 
evolution, drawing an analogy between evolution and learn-
ing (see more in Sect. 5.7).
It is interesting that those who have tried to define 
innateness often seemed to mean that, in contrast with 
learned behavior, innate behavior is in a sense “predeter-
mined” (Papaj 1993). In other words, in innate traits, the 
fit with the environment is predetermined, as opposed to 
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learned behavior or morphological plasticity, where the fit 
is “acquired.” However, notice that this predetermined fit 
is adaptation. In a system-first view of evolution, the evo-
lution of innateness, or automatization, is the evolution of 
adaptation. And, according to interaction-based evolution, 
the evolution of adaptation involves network-level evolution 
and the acquisition of a new phenotypic meaning as a result 
of the changing context in which modules are embedded.
4.15  The Engine of Evolution
Interaction-based evolution argues that the process whereby 
a population converges on an adaptation (Livnat 2013; 
Sects. 4.10, 4.12, 4.13) is a process that converts informa-
tion from a less orderly to a more orderly state. It proceeds 
from a fuzzy to a sharp, well-working and stereotyped 
state. However, evolution is not only a fuzzy-to-sharp pro-
cess, in that the fuzzy source must first arise. The progress 
from fuzzy to sharp is therefore only a half of a cycle of the 
“engine of creativity” that is evolution. The other half is 
that previously made sharp elements come together at a 
high level to make the new fuzzy source (e.g., the different 
instincts in the tern situation come together into a disor-
derly form of egg-retrieval), from which new sharp ele-
ments can be made (e.g., backward walking).26 I argued 
that simplification under performance pressure connects 
the two parts of the cycle. The simple elements it creates 
not only are improvements but also come together in new 
complex interactions which serve as the raw material for 
the next round of simplification. Thus, novelty arises not 
from accident, but from evolutionary work.
4.16  How Interaction‑Based Evolution Contributes 
to Past Literature on the Evolution of Novelty
We can now see how interaction-based evolution confirms 
previous, pioneering literature on the evolution of novelty. 
Even though the latter focused on the evolution of mor-
phology (Müller and Wagner 1991; Moczek 2008; Wagner 
and Lynch 2010; Peterson and Müller 2013), whereas the 
observations above pertain to the evolution of behavior, 
both conclude that network-level evolution is key to the 
evolution of novelty, and furthermore agree on multiple 
fundamental points that follow from this: First, cooption is 
central to novelty, as are elements of network evolution like 
duplication, fusion etc. (Gould and Vrba 1982; Müller 
1990; Müller and Wagner 1991; Schlichting and Pigliucci 
1998; West-Eberhard 2003; Hallgrímsson et  al. 2005; 
26 Of course, these cycles do not occur in a sequence one at a time. 
At any time point in the course of the evolution of a given life form 
we may expect many co-occurring cycles, each at a different phase.
Müller 2007a; Hallgrímsson et  al. 2012; Wagner 2014; 
Lynch et al. 2015). The emergence of a “byproduct,” where 
a trait evolved for one purpose comes to serve another, is 
not a side-issue but absolutely central to evolution (Sects. 
2.2, 3.4, 4.5, 4.12, 4.13, 4.15; Müller 1990; Müller and 
Wagner 1991; Müller and Newman 2005; Moczek 2008; 
Peterson and Müller 2013). Second, cooption is needed for 
the otherwise inexplicable incipient stage of a novel, com-
plex adaptation27 (Moczek 2008; Hallgrímsson et al. 2012; 
Arnold 2003; Müller and Newman 2005; Peterson and 
Müller 2013; Kaji et al. 2016). Third, the common distinc-
tion in the literature on novelty between two stages of evo-
lution—the modification of an existing character and the 
formation of a new character (Gould and Vrba 1982; Mül-
ler and Wagner 1991; Müller and Newman 2005; Wagner 
and Lynch 2010; Hallgrímsson et  al. 2012)—corresponds 
to the two stages of the evolutionary cycle discussed here 
(see Sect. 4.15). Fourth, network-level evolution—the evo-
lution of a complex whole—allows for the conversion of 
gradual to punctual change via the passing of thresholds 
(we have seen this in the egg retrieval discussion, 
Sect.  4.13; Waddington 1957; Müller and Streicher 1989; 
Müller and Wagner 1991; Moczek 2008; Hallgrímsson 
et al. 2012; Peterson and Müller 2013).
At the same time, interaction-based evolution also con-
tributes to this literature. First, as mentioned, while the lat-
ter focused on morphology, in the above I have provided 
complementary examples from the evolution of behavior. 
Second, even though past literature has recognized the cen-
trality of cooption for novelty and identified phenomena 
that facilitate cooption, such as gene duplication, “weak 
regulatory linkage” and more (Ohno 1970; Kirschner and 
Gerhart 2006; Gerhart and Kirschner 2007; Lynch 2007), 
it has not considered the possibility that there is a funda-
mental reason underlying the inherent ability of biologi-
cal entities to be coopted, or that this reason connects to 
non-accidental mutation. This paper has proposed that sim-
plification under performance pressure actively generates 
cooptability (see Sect.  3.4). Furthermore, it has proposed 
that simplification under performance pressure connects to 
27 Darwin (1859) recognized this point, but it has not been suffi-
ciently emphasized during the modern synthesis. As multiple authors 
have argued (Gould and Vrba 1982; Müller and Newman 2005; 
Wagner and Lynch 2010), the latter focused on the modification of 
an existing character under natural selection. The prominent position 
in twentieth century evolutionary theory of Wright’s shifting balance 
theory (Wright 1931, 1932), which attempts to explain the evolution 
of new, beneficial genetic interactions by crossing fitness landscape 
valleys with the help of random genetic drift, serves as evidence for 
the neglect of cooption during that period of time. As Hallgrímsson 
et al. (2012) pointed out, within Wright’s analogy, cooption is like a 
bridge over a valley from one adaptive peak to another, and does not 
require loss of fitness.
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non-accidental mutation as will be summarized in Sect. 5.2. 
Third, while this paper agrees with past literature on the 
distinction between the two stages abovementioned, it does 
not assume that the modification of existing characters can 
be accounted for by the traditional view of adaptation based 
on accidental mutation and natural selection, and that only 
the arising of a novel character cannot. Instead, it argues 
that the mutations that underlie network-level evolution 
throughout both stages are non-accidental and enable sim-
plification under performance pressure; that this simplifica-
tion under performance pressure is what makes a character 
cooptable while modifying it; and that the two stages thus 
come together in one unified process: one stage actively 
leads to the other.
Thus, the present paper bears on a major gap in tradi-
tional evolutionary theory. Multiple authors (Gould and 
Vrba 1982; Hallgrímsson et  al. 2012; Müller 1990; Mül-
ler and Wagner 1991; Schlichting and Pigliucci 1998; 
West-Eberhard 2003; Müller and Newman 2005; Moczek 
2008; Peterson and Müller 2013; Lynch et  al. 2011) have 
recognized the importance of cooption at both the molecu-
lar and organismal levels. Graur and Li called it “the para-
digm of molecular evolution” (Graur and Li 2000, p. 304). 
However, traditional population genetics focused on trying 
to explain the accumulation of slightly beneficial changes 
toward improvement in the same adaptation, not on how an 
element evolved for one purpose can later become useful 
for another (Gould and Vrba 1982; Müller and Newman 
2005; Wagner and Lynch 2010). This paper proposed that 
there is an active reason underlying cooptability—simpli-
fication under performance pressure—and that this active 
process offers an alternative explanation to many biologi-
cal phenomena at both the genetic and phenotypic levels 
besides economical considerations under accidental muta-
tion and natural selection.
5  A New View of the Evolutionary Process
In this section I will revisit the molecular level from the 
perspective of interaction-based evolution in light of the 
concepts proposed so far. I will clarify the nature of muta-
tion and raise directions for future research regarding it.
5.1  Interaction‑Based Evolution at the Microscale
Livnat (2013) introduced interaction-based evolution at the 
microscale. I will now reiterate some key points of the lat-
ter and then show how it is connected to the present paper.
Livnat (2013) argued that the mutations that drive adap-
tive evolution under selection result from continually evolv-
ing, complex biological processes and are therefore affected 
by genetic interactions across loci. Conceptualizing this in 
terms of information flow, it means that there is a flow of 
information from the alleles affecting the mutation into the 
mutation itself (Livnat 2013). The schematic figure that 
describes this nature of mutation (Fig. 2a) is much like that 
which would represent gene interaction and regulation, 
except that the outcome of the action in this case is genetic 
change. Importantly, “mutation” here is broadly construed 
to encompass not only DNA mutations but also epigenetic 
changes.
Moving to the population level, we see that the outcome 
of a mutational event in one generation—namely the muta-
tion itself—can serve as an input into mutational events at 
later generations. Therefore, mutations create a network of 
information flow across the genome and the generations 
(Fig.  3) (Livnat 2013). This immediately opens up a new 
Fig. 2  Mutation as a biological process, from Livnat (2013). a In 
this figure we see three loci coming together in a biological interac-
tion through gene products and cis elements. This part of the figure 
merely represents schematically the gene regulation and interaction 
that are key to our understanding of molecular and cellular biology. 
What is new about the figure is that we have not yet fully considered 
the possibility that there could be a mutation arrow too—that muta-
tion is an outcome of genetic interactions in a heritable mode; i.e., 
much like genes interact in influencing a classical trait, like the eye 
or the ear, they also interact in influencing genetic change. Note that 
the figure purposely leaves open the particulars of the mechanisms 
involved, as there may be many such mechanisms, and that “muta-
tion” is broadly construed to mean any heritable change. This may 
involve not only DNA changes but also epigenetic changes. b Muta-
tion as an event of information flow and computation changes many 
things in our conceptualization of evolution. Particularly, the bio-
logical process of mutation creates from the combination of interact-
ing alleles across loci a new heritable piece of information—a new 
mutation—a new allele, B*. Even though the particular combination 
of interacting alleles will sooner or later disappear due to the sex-
ual shuffling of the genes, information from it can be transmitted to 
future generations through the mutation. In this manner, the problems 




way of thinking on how the genome can evolve as a cohe-
sive whole (Mayr 1963; Livnat 2013).
This view connects the problem of the role of sexual 
reproduction in evolution to the nature of mutation. The 
layman’s intuition has been that, since natural selection acts 
on individual variation, the vast number of different genetic 
combinations generated by sex facilitates adaptive evolu-
tion. However, this answer has been incomplete from a the-
oretical perspective because, just as sex puts together these 
combinations, it also breaks them down. In other words, 
what is the point of presenting so many different combina-
tions to the test of selection, if they are not heritable? Here, 
the computational nature of mutation (Livnat 2013; Livnat 
and Papadimitriou 2016a, b) changes the situation.
Since mutation combines information from multiple loci 
and writes the result of the combination into one locus—
the locus of the mutation—it allows information from 
genetic combinations to be transmitted to future genera-
tions even though the combinations themselves are tran-
sient (Fig.  2b) (Livnat 2013; Livnat and Papadimitriou 
2016b). Intriguingly, such information flow through muta-
tion enables a situation where sex generates a vast number 
of different individuals, selection evaluates each individual 
as a complex whole, and information from that individual 
as a complex whole is passed on by mutations precisely in 
accord with the individual’s fitness (Livnat 2013).28
In this way, interaction-based evolution connected the 
problem of the role of sex in evolution, the empirical nature 
of mutation, and more, while raising predictions and direc-
tions for future research. Among these predictions are the 
following: (i) there is a genetic relatedness in mutational 
tendencies, and these tendencies are of fundamental signifi-
cance for the process of adaptive evolution; (ii) genes have 
a dual role: they encode both information that is relevant 
for their performance and information that is relevant for 
genetic change; and (iii) there exists a vast genetic activity 
in germ cells that is essential for adaptive evolution. Thus, 
while it is clear today that there are complex influences on 
mutation, Livnat (2013) argued that they are of fundamen-
tal importance for evolution. The present paper builds on 
the previous one in an important way: it relies on non-acci-
dental mutation to enact simplification under performance 
pressure, as demonstrated in Sect. 2.
5.2  Connections Between the Microscale 
and the Macroscale
Simplification under performance pressure and network-
level evolution connect to non-accidental mutation as fol-
lows: (i) They make it possible for mutation to be non-
accidental without reversing the one-way function from 
genotype to phenotype (Sect.  3.4). (ii) They remove the 
conceptual need for local genetic accident to be the source 
of new genetic information: because novelty arises at the 
system level from emerging interactions between units, 
the fact that the drivers of local genetic changes are non-
accidental is not contradictory to the emergence of novelty, 
because these changes still interact with each other glob-
ally in surprising and beneficial ways (Sects. 2.2, 3.4, 4.13). 
(iii) They require mechanisms of mutation to drive gradual 
network-level evolution in a syntactic way, including mech-
anisms of fusion, deletion, duplication and more (Sects. 2, 
2.3, 2.2, 5.4, 5.5).
However, as in past evolutionary theory, there is still a 
gap to be filled between genetic and phenotypic change. 
Long-term phenotypic fusion such as that of the neck and 
body movements in the inciting ceremony in ducks may 
require multiple events of gene rearrangement and point 
mutations. Therefore, understanding the causes of a gene 
fusion such as that of TRIM5 and CypA is of course a far 
cry from providing a detailed genetic account for a long-
term, phenotypic fusion. In addition, interaction-based 
evolution does not yet provide a detailed list of mutational 
28 We are no longer restricted to the effective transmission of addi-
tive genetic effects.
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Fig. 3  Mutation as an event of information transmission and compu-
tation creates a network of information flow through the generations, 
from Livnat (2013). Each box represents an individual, and in each 
box, the two sets of lines at the top represent that individual’s dip-
loid genotype (genes A through G), and the set of lines at the bot-
tom represents a haploid genotype transmitted through the gamete. 
For the sake of demonstration, a small number of mutational events 
due to interactions between genes is shown in two parents and an off-
spring (large boxes), although many mutations occur in other genes 
and in other individuals at the same time. For example, C* represents 
a mutation in one of the alleles of gene C. Because the output of a 
mutational event in one generation—namely the mutation itself (e.g., 
C*)—can serve as an input into mutational events at later generations 
(e.g., the event creating D*), non-accidental mutation creates a net-
work of information flow and computation through the generations, 
from many genes into one and from one gene to many, as well as 
from many individuals into one and from one individual to many.
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mechanisms. However, it does provide a small taste of such 
a list, including discussions of transcriptional promiscuity 
in germ cells (Sect. 2; Livnat 2013), genetic interactions as 
affecting mutations (Sect. 2; Livnat 2013), mechanisms of 
fusion and duplication as have been and will be discussed 
in this paper (Sects. 5.4, 5.5), and more.
A clarification is now required on the connection 
between the microscale and macroscale. In both the micro-
scale and the macroscale views of interaction-based evolu-
tion developed by Livnat (2013) and here respectively, there 
is a sense of chunking: On the microscale, information 
from multiple loci comes together in an event of genetic 
(or epigenetic) change. On the macroscale, genes as well as 
phenotypes can become fused in the long-term. However, 
the flow of information from the alleles at multiple loci 
affecting a mutation into the locus of the mutation does not 
mean that the mutation replicates and transmits the com-
bination of alleles that influenced it as is. Rather, the situ-
ation is partly analogous to that of a neuron, which sends 
a signal to further layers in the neural network generated 
from the transient combination of inputs that it received, 
but does not replicate that combination as is. That is, Fig. 3 
depicts the information flow that is the moment-to-moment 
workings of evolution; and it is many such events of infor-
mation flow, at many loci, in many individuals, that come 
together into a network of information flow that gradually 
leads through the generations to the conditions permitting 
genetic- and organismal-level chunking and cooption in the 
long-term (e.g., gene fusion, the evolution of alternative 
splicing patterns, or phenotypic fusion; Sects. 2, 2.1, 2.3).
5.3  The Two Ecologies Working Together: The Ecology 
of Energy and the Ecology of Information
I will now put the arguments of Livnat (2013) and of this 
paper into one philosophical picture. A machine has sev-
eral aspects: First, it is a finite, unchanging structure that 
repeats its operation over and over again, performing the 
same “trick.” Second, we tend to think of a machine as 
something that operates harmoniously and whose parts 
have been conceived to fit each other harmoniously. Third, 
novelty or “out of the box” thinking is the antithesis of 
machine-like behavior.
Now, the traditional idea of natural selection and ran-
dom mutation is machine-like in the first sense: it is one 
trick that repeats itself indefinitely without changing its 
own fundamental nature. That is, random mutation occurs 
either as an error during replication or for other accidental 
reasons, and natural selection either accepts it or rejects it. 
The repetition of this operation is traditionally supposed to 
be responsible for all of life and every innovation in it—a 
belief that I have argued against.
Here, I will draw the distinction that the writing of 
mutation postulated by interaction-based evolution (Livnat 
2013) is not machine-like in any of the above senses. First, 
the writing itself evolves and its evolution is fundamental to 
its operation—its operation is not repetitive (Livnat 2013). 
Second, the workings of evolution are not devoid of inter-
nal conflict but rather are based on it, as will be discussed 
shortly. Third, the production of novelty is at the essence 
of evolution. (Notice, however, that while evolution is not 
machine-like, its products are machine-like: evolution is 
a process of automatization, as the observations show; 
Sect. 4).
What is the nature of mutation then? Let us consider the 
nature of regular traits first. Take locomotion for example: 
we share with bears the fact that we have four limbs; but 
unlike bears we are habitual bipeds; and each of us may 
have a specific leg length and muscular details slightly dif-
ferent from those of others. In other words, a trait consists 
of widely shared and generally defined characteristics along 
with more specific and more narrowly shared characteris-
tics, up to and including individual differences. Accord-
ing to interaction-based evolution, the mutation-writing 
phenotype has the same meta-structure as the performing 
phenotype (Livnat 2013). It consists of generally defined 
and widely shared characteristics (for example, the long-
term trend of the movement of genes out of the X chromo-
some in Drosophila; Vibranovski et  al. 2009), along with 
more specific and narrowly shared characteristics up to and 
including individual differences in mutational tendencies 
(Livnat 2013). This meta-structure implies that mutational 
tendencies are more similar the more closely related the 
entities under consideration are (Livnat 2013). Further-
more, it implies that the nature of mutational mechanisms 
can be conceptualized by analogy to ecological interac-
tions: The writing of mutations happens not according to a 
fixed “rule” but by the ever evolving “rules of the jungle.” 
This “jungle” is a complex one consisting of DNA and 
other biomolecules. The actors in it—the genetic influences 
on mutation—meet in an individual due to sexual reproduc-
tion, and genetic changes happen in accordance with the 
usual tendencies of the actors, their individual character-
istics and the particular combination they appear in in the 
given situation. All the while, the actors themselves slowly 
evolve in the long-term. Thus, when we talk about the 
workings of mutation, we are not talking about a harmoni-
ous, repetitive operation of a single mechanism. Instead, we 
are talking about the workings of an “ecology,” except that 
the outcome is remembered not in terms of energy trans-
fers such as food-web interactions but in terms of symbolic 
changes in genomes: it is an ecology of information.
According to this picture, the biological world has two 
facets to it, two “forces”: one that is due to biological inter-
actions that make their mark through differential survival 
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and reproduction; and one that is due to biological interac-
tions that make their mark by influencing genetic change—
by the writing of mutations (Livnat 2013). These latter 
biological interactions are not limited to molecular mech-
anisms operating inside the germ cells, but involve also 
anything else that affects the writing of mutations, such as 
mechanisms of mate choice and of the sexual shuffling of 
the genes (Livnat 2013).
These two forces come together in the individual: the 
selection of individuals determines which alleles will be 
passed on, and the writing of alleles determines which 
alleles will be there in the first place. Thus, selection and 
writing are equally influential forces, and they both par-
ticipate in changing the genetic and phenotypic nature of 
the organism and thus of themselves. While each of these 
forces has some long-term (phylogenetically shared) ten-
dencies, each is oblivious to the present, immediate work-
ings of the other: the intra-organismal writing of mutations 
that takes place at the present moment is shielded from the 
external workings of natural selection that takes place at 
the present moment and vice-versa, even though the con-
sequences of each will eventually affect the nature of the 
other. In that sense, evolution arises from a conflict, or a 
process of negotiation, between these two fundamental 
forces; and what happens in the long-term must be more or 
less congruent with both.
5.4  A Balance of Continually Evolving Mutational 
Forces is Responsible for Genetic Change
I argued above that the writing of mutations is analogous 
to an ecology. An ecology is a system of conflicting forces, 
where each species presses to produce more of itself while 
at the same time undoing the growth of others. And indeed, 
when we examine molecular evolutionary changes, we 
often see that long-term processes result from a balance of 
forces in the short-term.
Consider tandem gene duplication. A gene that is dupli-
cated at tandem experiences an increased chance not only 
of being further duplicated but also of losing a copy, due to 
the nature of the mutational mechanisms of tandem dupli-
cation and deletion (Graur and Li 2000). At the same time, 
mutations that arise in the copies in the course of evolu-
tion push toward evolutionary divergence of the copies and 
thus toward the cessation of duplication/deletion (because 
homology is required for tandem duplication/deletion), 
while gene conversion events push to make the copies the 
same again, a situation where copies are more likely to 
disappear. Evolution here is a reversible process where the 
long-term outcome depends on a balance of forces. Note 
also that, in this case, gene conversion may be seen as sim-
plification, and diversification as complexification, and that 
the opposing tendencies to duplicate and specialize on the 
one hand and to equalize and collapse on the other may be 
part of maintaining a balance between over-specialization 
(or “over-fitting”) and over-simplification, showing the 
importance of the “ecology of information” for evolution.
As another example, consider the evolution of CpG con-
tent, which plays a role in gene regulation and therefore 
development (Suzuki and Bird 2008; Deaton and Bird 
2011). The cytosine in CpG dinucleotides mutates into thy-
mine at a high rate after it is methylated (Hodgkinson and 
Eyre-Walker 2011), causing CpG-poor islands to lose their 
CpGs (Mendelson-Cohen et  al. 2011). Importantly, this 
cytosine is methylated by complex enzymatic processes 
(Klose and Bird 2006), which means that the locations of 
these mutations are determined by these biological pro-
cesses (Livnat 2013). At the same time, another mutational 
force—that of biased gene conversion—adds cytosine to 
some CpG-poor islands (Galtier et al. 2001; Duret and Gal-
tier 2009), and the balance of such forces determines the 
direction of the evolution of CpG content (Mendelson-
Cohen et al. 2011). The fact that this balance affects in the 
long term functional, adaptive structure (Suzuki and Bird 
2008; Deaton and Bird 2011) fits with interaction-based 
evolution (Livnat 2013) but is perplexing from a traditional 
perspective.29 Note that CpG mutations have been esti-
mated to account for nearly 25% of all point mutations in 
humans30 (Fryxell and Moon 2005).
As yet another example, based on an analysis of short 
open reading frames in yeast, Carvunis et  al. (2012) have 
suggested that the evolution of new genes is gradual and 
reversible: that a new gene does not arise suddenly as a 
complete whole, but gradually through forms more and 
more resembling a complete gene; and that at each point in 
time, the gene can make a step toward or away from com-
pletion. I argue that this process too is driven by a balance 
of forces. In mammals, for example, it would involve the 
evolution of CpG content discussed above, among other 
things.
Finally, consider the proliferation vs. silencing and 
removal of transposable elements (TEs). The divide 
between those who think that TEs are serviceable to the 
organism (e.g., McClintock 1965; Britten and Davidson 
1969; Lynch et al. 2011; Shapiro 2011; Fedoroff 2012) and 
those who see them as “selfish-elements” (Dawkins 1976; 
29 Indeed, as Duret and Galtier argued, CpGs work en masse, and the 
impact of any one particular CpG mutation is insignificant and could 
not be explained by traditional natural selection (Duret and Galtier 
2009).
30 This is the case even though CpG dinucleotides account for only 
about 1% of the human genome. Furthermore, they are often accom-
panied by mutations in nearby bases (Qu et  al. 2012; Walser et  al. 
2008), further compounding the involvement of mutational mecha-
nisms in their origination.
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Orgel and Crick 1980; Doolittle and Sapienza 1980) is well 
known. Supporting the former, it is now clear that TEs play 
a major role in adaptive evolution (e.g., Bourque et  al. 
2008; Sasaki et al. 2008; Fechotte 2008; Lynch et al. 2011). 
However, the evolutionary “benefit” they bring resides in a 
timescale too long to allow them to be interpreted as some-
thing other than selfish elements under the traditional view. 
However, as argued above (Sect. 5.3) the writing of muta-
tions is an ecology; it is not machine-like. TEs may well act 
as though they are propelled to replicate and insert them-
selves wherever they can, and yet, in the context of the 
rules of the evolving information ecology, they may be 
serving the evolution of the organism in the long-term.31 
Indeed, giving contra-pressure to TE proliferation is an 
extensive and phylogenetically deep system of regulation, 
involving methylation and TE removal, active in the ger-
mline (Thomson and Lin 2009). I agree with Fedoroff 
(2012), that this extensive system does not merely act as an 
“immune defense,” and furthermore argue that it is actually 
a part of the mutation-writing ecology.
The four examples above clarify the view of genetic 
change as an ecology of information. It is a view of con-
flicting forces pushing against each other, including long-
term processes that may be locally reversible. This ecology 
of information computes in the long-term and involves the 
evolution of the network as a whole: the network gradually 
changes as it finds where it can give way under this com-
plex set of forces. Thus, through mutational writing, and 
under natural selection, the evolving network processes a 
large amount of information.
5.5  Evolutionary Mutational Mechanisms: A Field 
Open to Future Study
Interaction-based evolution opens up the search for non-
Lamarckian yet useful mutational mechanisms. Earlier I 
proposed a gene-fusion mechanism that may play a role in 
evolution reminiscent of the role that Hebbian learning 
plays in neural networks (Sect. 2; see also Sect. 5.7): copies 
of genes that are used together are more likely to be fused 
together. This type of mechanism would not cause acciden-
tal changes but rather would produce evolutionarily useful 
31 This is the case even if they have the appearance of “selfish 
agents” that has been attributed to them, and even if they occasion-
ally cause accidents in the short-term in the form of genetic disease 
(Livnat 2013). Livnat and Pippenger (2006) explored from a math-
ematical perspective in another realm the idea that a system with its 
own objective function can be composed of conflicting agents.
genetic variation, without violating the principle that muta-
tions do not respond to the immediate environment.32
Another example is as follows. A gene that is highly 
expressed and is therefore extensively used may be more 
likely to be duplicated via reverse transcription or other 
transcription-coupled mutational mechanisms. This may 
be useful because such a gene may be needed in yet higher 
quantities or may have a greater potential to beneficially 
specialize evolutionarily into different functions. As in the 
case of the gene fusion mechanism of Sect. 2, this can hap-
pen also when the gene is extensively used in the soma, 
because information about the pattern and extent of expres-
sion of a gene is present in the DNA and accessible in the 
germ cells in principle, and may be manifested by the tran-
scriptional promiscuity of the germline (see Sect. 2).
When operating in unicellulars, such mechanisms could 
explain, among other things, cases of rapid adaptive evo-
lution in response to environmental pressures such as 
extreme temperatures, extreme salinity, or toxins, where 
a gene whose product is in demand is duplicated/ampli-
fied (Kondrashov 2012). Indeed, at first glance, they may 
seem Lamarckian, but they are essentially not so. While in 
unicellulars, environmental pressures may directly cause 
the overexpression of a gene and thus increase its propen-
sity to be duplicated through mutational mechanisms, in 
general it is evolution itself that would lead to a situation 
where a gene is highly expressed and to the application of 
the same mutational mechanisms in a non-Lamarckian, yet 
useful, fashion. The fusion of CypA and Trim5 serves as an 
example here as well, since it involved duplication of CypA 
through retrotranscription, and extensive transcription of 
CypA in the germline may have facilitated it (Kaessmann 
et al. 2009).
Also of interest in this regard are cases such as the evo-
lution of insecticide resistance in the mosquito Culex pipi-
ens due to the amplification of the genes coding for two 
non-specific esterases as well as for the acetylcholinester-
ase that is the main target of the applied insecticides, which 
is active in the central nervous system (Lenormand et  al. 
1998; Labbé et  al. 2007). These duplications may have 
32 Interestingly, while the mutational fusion mechanism hypothesized 
earlier is based on putting together empirical observations (namely 
the nature of transcription, chromatin states, reverse transcription 
and gene fusion), its general nature was predicted based on the theo-
retical considerations of interaction-based evolution (Livnat 2013): in 
the latter, the conceptual connection between the problem of sexual 
recombination and mutational mechanisms required that genes play 
a dual role: one of performance under natural selection, and another 
of influencing mutation in the germline (Livnat 2013). Thus, the cou-
pling of germline mutation and somatic performance through tran-
scription as in the mechanism hypothesized earlier allows for a con-
vergence of diverse empirical and theoretical considerations.
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originated not by accident but by a gradual albeit rapid pro-
cess of evolution involving natural selection and non-acci-
dental mutation, which has created the genetic conditions 
under which the duplication mechanisms are more likely to 
be activated.33
Interaction-based evolution draws our attention to the 
fact that mechanisms such as the above can exist and puts 
them front and center. The examples above demonstrate 
that the evolving organism can receive feedback on which 
genetic changes would be useful to attempt—for example, 
which genes may be beneficially chunked together. Further-
more, this feedback comes not from the immediate environ-
ment, but from the population’s past successes under natu-
ral selection. That is, the information is in the genome; no 
Lamarckism is required.
By accepting that mutation is not accidental, we open 
the door to examining future research questions that would 
not have come to light otherwise. Indeed, we may expect 
a diversity of mutation-writing mechanisms in nature that 
interact with each other, and the above are merely two 
examples of these. While some of these mechanisms may 
be well known phenomena that have not yet been placed 
within a theoretical framework—for example the fact that 
recombinational mechanisms interact with DNA sequences 
in such manner that enables whole gene duplication and 
deletion—many others may remain to be discovered, like 
the innumerable details of the still-living RNA world and 
how it interacts with evolution (Brosius 2005; Morris and 
Mattick 2014; Knisbacher and Levanon 2015).
5.6  The Intimate Relationship Between Useful Change 
and Error Repair
It is so often assumed that mutation is a replication error 
that one might think that this is a well-known scientific 
fact. However, the only fact that has actually been estab-
lished is the basic observation itself—that while some 
genes are duplicated, others undergo genetic change. To say 
that these changes represent nothing more than “replication 
errors” is to provide merely one interpretation to this fact, 
and it may be a prejudiced one. This interpretation has led, 
among other things, to the terms “error-repair mechanisms” 
and “error-prone repair mechanisms,” which, according to 
the theory presented here, may end up detracting from our 
understanding of evolution.
Error is often a deviation from a pattern. By noticing a 
deviation from a pattern we can find and fix a typographical 
error: a word with a typo slightly differs from many correct 
33 Such a process would enable selection on multiple or many loci to 
be funneled by mutational mechanisms over the generations to influ-
ence the probability of duplication of a particular gene or genes.
instances of that word which are all identical to each other; 
and it can be fixed by making it identical to those other 
instances. Then again, by noticing a deviation from a pat-
tern, we can also avoid picking a rotten apple in the store, 
even if we have never seen rot or an apple before. Taking 
one step further, by noticing a deviation from a pattern we 
can also spot an error of thought. Take for example Scala 
Naturae, according to which all organisms fall into a lin-
ear order from the simplest to the most advanced. From 
that perspective, the fact that many organisms are hard to 
classify as more or less advanced in relation to each other 
is a deviation from a pattern. By replacing Scala Naturae 
with Darwin’s concept of common descent, this difficulty 
of classification becomes not a deviation from a pattern but 
a part of a larger pattern involving other facts. Thus, both 
errors of typing and errors of thought can be corrected by 
pattern completion at different levels.
At the same time, pattern completion is a form of simpli-
fication: as information theory makes clear (Li and Vitányi 
1997), the fewer exceptions to a rule we need to have, the 
smaller the amount of information needed to describe the 
entire system and its parts. Thus, if pattern-completion 
operations can be implemented by mutation, we may see 
the same genetic mechanisms operating both in “typo-
graphical corrections” and in the kind of mutational writ-
ing that leads to progressive evolution. As an example, in 
the case of duplication and deletion discussed in Sect. 5.4, 
repeated events of gene conversion have the potential to 
correct “typos,” but they also have the potential to imple-
ment simplification pressure opposing the complexification 
pressure of diversification.
The insufficiency of our current jargon is made particu-
larly clear by the phrase “error-prone repair.” Suppose that, 
in some cases where so-called “error-prone repair” is acti-
vated, the biological system is actually pushing for a change 
rather than a restoration of the genetic state, and that this 
change is a part of a pattern-completion operation or other 
progressive evolution of the network as a whole. Then we 
are looking at a mechanism that is not prone to typographi-
cal errors, but that is correcting errors in the construction 
of a fit organism. In other words, what we have heretofore 
thought of as “error-prone” is actually an attempt at “error-
correction,” where the “error” is of a different, deeper kind 
than we are accustomed to thinking about.
5.7  Evolution as Learning
From Paley (1802) to Dawkins (1986), there is universal 
agreement that adaptations are incredibly impressive and 
complex pieces of “natural technology.” While Paley used 
this observation to make the non-scientific point that, much 
like a watch has an intelligent watchmaker, life was cre-
ated by a supernatural intelligence (Paley 1802), Dawkins 
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argued that the process responsible for life is a very simple 
process of accidental mutation and natural selection that is 
fully understood at its essence. In the preface to The Blind 
Watchmaker (Dawkins 1986), he wrote that “[t]his book is 
written in the conviction that our own existence once pre-
sented the greatest of all mysteries, but that it is a mystery 
no longer... Darwin and Wallace solved it, though we shall 
continue to add footnotes to their solution for a while yet.”
Let us now revisit this question, but from a strictly sci-
entific perspective, and without assuming that all that is 
essentially important was already revealed at Darwin’s 
time: Could the process generating life forms and the pro-
cess generating artificial technology be similar in some 
respects?
Interestingly, according to Papaj (1993), it is a curi-
ous historical fact that the earliest ideas on evolution, i.e., 
Lamarckism, revolved around observations on automatism 
in behavior: observations showing that instinct is similar 
to well-learned behavior—an evolved phenomenon is simi-
lar to a learned phenomenon—in that both can be carried 
out automatically and independently of external influences, 
and both are stereotyped, or robotic, repeating with a high 
degree of uniformity. These observations fostered the idea 
that what is repeated many times over the generations grad-
ually impresses itself upon the hereditary makeup of the 
organism, which led in turn to the additional but erroneous 
idea of Lamarckian transmissionism. Until now, Lamarck-
ism has been the only alternative to natural selection at the 
most basic level of analysis. And even though it has been 
rightfully rejected as a general-level explanation for evolu-
tion, the observations it was supposed to explain are still 
here (and have been discussed in Sect. 4). That is, the con-
troversy was never over the observations but rather over the 
mechanism of evolution. The current paper provides a new 
interpretation of these original observations and suggests 
that there is a connection between evolution and learning: 
network-level evolution and automatization are key to both. 
This connection is free of Lamarckian transmissionism and 
requires a process based on non-accidental mutation and 
natural selection.
Not only in evolution, but also in the study of brain and 
behavior, the notion of random generation and filtering was 
once used. For instance, Skinner had suggested a mecha-
nism of random generation of ideas and filtering for how 
learning by the brain works (see Fodor and Piattelli-Pal-
marini 2011). However, more recently, Fodor and Piattelli-
Palmarini (2011) argued that such a mechanism applies 
neither to evolution nor to the brain.34 In this paper and ear-
34 Likewise, Lakatosh (1976) asked whether there is nothing more to 
intelligence than randomization as generating ideas and selection sift-
ing among them.
lier (Livnat 2013), I argued that the mechanism of evolu-
tion is not that of random generation and filtering, and that 
the causes of mutation are critical for our understanding of 
evolution. This may also inform our understanding of 
learning.
Recently, Valiant (2009, 2013) attempted to connect 
evolution and machine learning (see also Feldman 2008, 
2009a, b; Kanade, 2011 and Angelino and Kanade 2014 in 
the same line; and Chastain et al., 2014). Methodologically, 
his work signifies a turning point: unlike classical popula-
tion genetics, it provides rigorous mathematical techniques 
that capture analytically a complex phenotypic structure 
and allow us to quantify and study the evolution of com-
plexity (Valiant 2009, 2013). Thus, with respect to theoreti-
cal methodology, it is a grand vision and, in principle, it 
allows mutation to be non-accidental. However, while Val-
iant’s framework allows for, but has not yet substantially 
pursued, non-accidental mutation,35 interaction-based evo-
lution argues that mutation is non-accidental and that this is 
crucial for evolution (Livnat 2013). And while Valiant’s 
work may be an inspiring step in the right direction, accord-
ing to the present paper, there are elements that are not yet 
included in it that are essential for biological evolution 
based on non-accidental mutation. These include cooption 
(Sects. 2, 4); the idea that simplification under performance 
pressure produces elements that have the inherent capacity 
to become useful in new contexts, which leads to cooption 
(Sect.  3); the idea that learning through evolutionary 
change is a learning from the environment by emancipation 
and acceleration (Sect.  4.14), i.e., by the evolution of 
automatization and innateness; and the concept of the 
absorption of meaning from context under gradual net-
work-level change. Indeed, the importance of cooption in 
evolution cannot be overestimated, and has been demon-
strated here at both the molecular and organismal levels 
(Sects. 2, 4). Furthermore, cooption is analogous to an 
analogy or metaphor, which are crucial in the evolution of 
language (Deutscher 2010) as well as in human intelli-
gence. It may be of much interest to explore these missing 
elements from a computational perspective.
Since its inception (Livnat 2013), interaction-based 
evolution has been deeply connected to the computational 
worldview (Papadimitriou 2007; Karp 2011), because 
it proposed that mutation is an event of information flow 
35 Valiant’s framework allows mutation to be an outcome of any effi-
cient randomized algorithm. Such algorithms use random bits in a 
controlled fashion, which is different from mutations that are noth-
ing but random changes anywhere in the genome. At the same time, 
his foundational model (Valiant 2009) attempts to retain an important 




and computation: the inputs into a mutational event are the 
alleles at the loci affecting the mutation through genetic 
interaction, and the output is the mutation itself (by “muta-
tion” I mean not only a change in the DNA but any herit-
able change, such as an epigenetic change) (Livnat 2013). 
Furthermore, the fact that the output of a mutational event 
at one generation, namely the mutation itself, can serve as 
an input into mutational events at later generations means 
that the mutation-writing phenotype creates a network 
of information flow through the generations, from many 
genes into any one gene and from any one gene to many 
(see Fig. 3) (Livnat 2013). Other examples of networks of 
information flow and computation include the brain, and 
what computer scientists call a circuit (Papadimitriou 2003; 
Wegener 1987) (one instance of which is an artificial neural 
network; Hopfield 1982). Thus, according to interaction-
based evolution, genetic evolution can be seen as the result 
of the workings of a network, itself evolving over time.
Interestingly, in artificial neural networks, local compu-
tational elements are used such as Hebbian learning (e.g., 
Hopfield 1982). In the latter, when one neuron persistently 
participates in causing another to fire, the strength of the 
synapse between them is increased (Hebb 1949). Hebbian 
learning is an example of a local simplification operation 
that, in the context of the gradual change of a complex 
network, is useful. Now, elements of this sort can play a 
role in the network of information flow generated by sex 
and non-accidental mutation proposed by interaction-based 
evolution (Livnat 2013); indeed, the mutational fusion 
mechanism in Sect.  2 is one such case. Thus, we see in 
multiple ways that, according to interaction-based evolu-
tion, evolution and “thinking processes” have more to do 
with each other than previously thought, even though no 
Lamarckism and no “foresight” or “adaptive mutation” as 
traditionally defined are involved. Thus, evolution may be 
seen as a learning process, and the study of evolution could 
inform the study of learning and vice-versa.
Recently, a connection between evolution and learning 
was drawn by Watson and Szathmáry (2016) and Watson 
et al. (2016). While this connection shares with the theory 
of interaction-based evolution as proposed earlier (Livnat 
2013) and here the idea that evolution is network-based, 
and that the change of connections between the nodes of 
the network is key, there are also some fundamental differ-
ences between the two. Watson and Szathmáry (2016) and 
Watson et al. (2016) did not argue for non-accidental muta-
tion, and all that follows from it.
For example, it follows from non-accidental mutation 
that Hebbian learning–like mechanisms can be imple-
mented directly by the mutational mechanisms themselves 
(as opposed to needing to arise from accidental mutation 
and natural selection; Watson and Szathmáry 2016), as dis-
cussed in Sect. 2. There, I argued that genes that are used 
together are fused together.36 More generally, I argued that 
simplification can be implemented by mutational mecha-
nisms. In fact, the very concept of non-accidental mutation 
itself represents a vast network, as discussed here and by 
Livnat (2013). Conceptualizing mutation itself as the out-
come of network-based processes provides a far more 
involved network-based view of evolution than otherwise, 
and greatly strengthens the connection between computer 
science and evolution (Papadimitriou 2007; Karp 2011).
In addition, borrowing from knowledge in machine 
learning, the above-mentioned authors mention that, among 
other things, imposing parsimony pressure by imposing a 
connection cost in models of genotype-phenotype maps 
can facilitate evolution in these models (Watson and Szath-
máry 2016; Watson et al. 2016; Clune et al. 2013; Kouvaris 
et al. 2015). However, they do not put simplification pres-
sure front and center in biological evolution, as done here. 
The present paper established the importance of simplifica-
tion in biological evolution by providing both the rationale 
and many empirical examples from both the molecular and 
organismal levels behind this point. On this foundation, it 
argued that biological evolution is driven by two forces—
the pressure for performance and the pressure for simpli-
fication. A cycle in evolution begins at a fuzzy state from 
the emergent interactions between preexisting elements. 
From these interactions, simplification under performance 
pressure creates new elements that have the inherent capac-
ity to come together into unexpected, useful interactions 
with other such elements. This leads to cooption, and to 
the beginning of another cycle in the process. Thus, putting 
simplification front and center in biological evolution also 
puts cooption at the heart of the evolutionary process. In 
addition, from this cycle we also obtain the idea that sim-
plification leads to biological complexity (Sect. 3). Indeed, 
simplification, according to interaction-based evolution, is 
a creative force.
Following the logic of Clune et  al., one would need to 
justify biologically a substantial cost to a single genetic 
connection per se if traditional selection is to simplify a 
genetic network based on random mutation (Clune et  al. 
2013). In contrast, interaction-based evolution argues that 
simplification is an active, mechanistic force in biological 
evolution, and that it can be implemented directly by muta-
tional mechanisms. Indeed, this paper has argued that many 
empirical observations, from gene translocation and fusion 
(Sect.  2), gene conversion and deletion (Sect.  5.4), and 
36 In contrast, Watson et  al. argue that “genes that are selected 
together are wired together.” There is a fundamental difference 
between the two statements, because Watson et al. imply a process of 
random mutation and natural selection. Namely, they base their state-
ment on a pioneering theoretical model (Pavlicev et al. 2011), but one 
that is constructed within the random-mutation view.
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pattern completion and error-repair (Sect.  5.6) on the 
genetic level, to the removal of rudimentary organs, the 
evolution of innateness, the evolution of stereotypy and rit-
ualization, the evolution of an adaptation from fuzzy to 
sharp and more on the organismal level are better explained 
by active simplification under performance pressure than 
by minute costs and benefits under accidental mutation and 
natural selection. Furthermore, interaction-based evolution 
argues that mutational mechanisms, mixing of the heredi-
tary material (which has evolved into sex), simplification 
and selection have all existed from the “beginning” of 
life.37 They did not evolve from an asexual world with acci-
dental mutation, since that world never existed (Livnat 
2013). Thus, they are not elements that evolved by acciden-
tal mutation and natural selection based on different costs 
and benefits imposed by that process, but rather are pri-
mary elements that are original and inherent to the process 
of evolution. Thus, interaction-based evolution is different 
from the evolvability view present in previous biological 
literature (see more in Sect. 5.8).
Indeed, interaction-based evolution provides a complete, 
biologically motivated, conceptual framework for evolu-
tion with non-accidental mutation at its center. By arguing 
that novelty arises from emergent interactions, it places the 
source of novelty at the system level. This in turn replaces 
the notion of accidental mutation as the ultimate source of 
heritable novelty, which in turn connects back to the center-
piece of non-accidental mutation. This entire framework 
and all of its elements, including cooption, novelty and 
non-accidental mutation, as well as the idea that simplifi-
cation leads to complexity, and the idea that evolutionary 
learning occurs through automatization and innateness, 
have not been discussed in previous papers on evolution 
and learning.
5.8  How Interaction‑Based Evolution differs 
from Previous Theories Involving Non‑random 
Mutation
Lamarckism and notions of directed or adaptive mutation 
that it influenced imply that an organism can respond ben-
eficially through genetic change to the immediate environ-
ment. Thus, if an organism is moved from environment A 
to environment B, its mutational tendencies may change 
accordingly (Futuyma 2009,  p. 282). In contrast, accord-
ing to interaction-based evolution, the probabilities of 
genetic change are affected by information that is in the 
genome and that has been the outcome of past evolution 
over the generations under the joint action of selection and 
37 This may not have been a “beginning” but a gradual transition 
(Livnat 2013).
continually evolving mutational tendencies—these prob-
abilities are generally not affected directly by the environ-
ment (see more in Sect.  5.5). Thus, when an organism is 
moved from environment A to B, its mutational tendencies 
may well remain the same during its lifetime, even though 
they are non-accidental and still respond to past, long-term 
selection pressures.
Interaction-based evolution shares with past works on 
evolvability and on modifiers of the mutation rate (Kimura 
1967; Leigh 1970; Sterelny 2007; Koonin 2011; Ram and 
Hadany 2012, 2014) the basic recognition that there are 
evolved genetic influences on mutation. However, the latter 
have assumed either implicitly or explicitly that accidental 
mutation is at the core of the adaptive evolutionary process, 
first by relying on accidental mutation and natural selec-
tion for the evolution of mutational mechanisms in the first 
place, and second by treating these mechanisms as helpful 
but not essential add-ons to the core process of accidental 
mutation and natural selection. In contrast, interaction-
based evolution argues that biological evolution has always 
depended essentially on the joint action of mutational 
mechanisms and natural selection, and indeed, none of its 
main points have been proposed by past literature on evolv-
ability (see more in Sect. 5.7).
Furthermore, evolvability sensu mutational mechanisms 
only allows a repetitive pressure to lead to a generic muta-
tional response to that pressure. For example, the supposed 
S.O.S. system in bacteria is thought to have evolved to 
increase the general accidental mutation rate as a generic 
response to starvation (Radman 1999; Caporale 2003; 
Koonin 2011). In contrast, I argue that an ever-present 
force of mutational mechanisms is part of evolution in 
general, because evolution is always a joint evolution of a 
mutation-writing phenotype and a performing phenotype 
(Livnat 2013). Therefore, continually evolving, per-locus 
probabilities of mutation affect the evolution of each adap-
tation specifically in an ongoing manner even if the pres-
sure for it is not repetitive but appears only during one evo-
lutionary period of time. For example, in the discussion of 
the TRIM5-CypA fusion in Sect.  2, I proposed that adap-
tive evolution in response to pathogen pressure, which had 
made these two genes come to work tightly together, had 
affected the fusion probability of these two particular genes, 
which has driven the evolution of this adaptation further. 
Indeed, related to this difference between interaction-based 
evolution and evolvability, only interaction-based evolu-
tion raised the clear prediction that there is a relatedness 
in mutational tendencies—that mutations are more similar 
the more closely related the entities under consideration are 
(Livnat 2013)—and that these tendencies are of fundamen-
tal importance for adaptive evolution (Livnat 2013).
Among those who have discussed non-accidental 
mutation, Shapiro and Caporale deserve much credit for 
Evol Biol 
1 3
promulgating this idea (Shapiro 2011; Caporale 2003). 
Shapiro sees mutation as “natural genetic engineering” 
(Shapiro 2011) and has made an analogy between mutation 
(especially, transposable elements activity) and the format-
ting of a computer drive (Shapiro 2002, 2011). Caporale 
has also examined examples of non-accidental mutation 
at the molecular level (Caporale 2003). While I share with 
both the basic recognition that mutation is non-accidental, 
and with Shapiro the belief in the importance of the com-
putational view, none of the main ideas of interaction-based 
evolution are present in their work.
Finally, it is instructive to consider orthogenesis of the 
nineteenth century (Gould 2002) as a theory of non-ran-
dom mutation. However, orthogenesis and related ideas 
have been proposed either as a complete replacement to or 
as an auxiliary force under natural selection (Gould 2002). 
Interaction-based evolution argues instead that internal fac-
tors, i.e., mutational mechanisms, and natural selection (in 
the sense of differential survival and reproduction) work 
jointly as two complementary forces—simplification under 
performance pressure—to drive adaptive evolution.
6  Conclusions
How does novelty arise? Traditional evolutionary think-
ing relies on accidental mutation and natural selection. The 
idea is that radiation, replication errors, oxidative stress, 
etc. cause local genetic accidents that, on rare occasions, 
provide beneficial phenotypic changes. All that remains 
for natural selection to do is to check whether a mutation 
is beneficial or detrimental—to play the role of a sieve. 
Where does the new genetic information come from? Pre-
sumably, in that view, it comes from the accident itself, 
and there is nothing more to inquire about the source of it 
that is essential for our understanding of the process. As 
explained, one important amendment to this view has been 
evolvability. However, evolvability sensu the genotype-
phenotype map focuses on the translation of genetic infor-
mation to phenotypic change, not on the causes of genetic 
change; and evolvability sensu mutational mechanisms 
still relies, implicitly or explicitly, on accidental mutation 
at the core of the process. Another important approach has 
been that of the modern literature on novelty; but while 
this approach is consistent with the present paper in multi-
ple important ways, it does not focus on the question of the 
causes of mutation.
Interaction-based evolution proposes an alternative. The 
mutations that are relevant for adaptive evolution under 
selection are due to mutational mechanisms that are contin-
ually evolving, and that do not in and of themselves invent 
things. Rather, novelty arises from the system level—from 
the macroscale—from gradual network-level evolution, as 
these mechanisms absorb information from selection. In 
brief, mutational mechanisms perform simplification oper-
ations on the genetic network, as well as gene duplication, 
in a heritable mode. These mechanisms work together with 
natural selection (which acts on the organism as a com-
plex whole, not on single genes as independent actors), so 
that adaptive evolution is a process of simplification under 
performance pressure. A cycle in this process begins with 
complex, high-level interactions between preexisting ele-
ments. Simplification under performance pressure takes 
these preexisting interactions and, gradually, over the 
course of evolution, creates from them new elements and 
new adaptations. Because these new elements are created 
in a process of simplification under performance pressure, 
they have the inherent capacity of coming together in new, 
useful and unexpected interactions at higher levels, thus ini-
tiating another cycle in the process. This capacity to come 
together in useful high-level interactions that have not been 
pursued in advance is the source of novelty in evolution. In 
short, mutations do not in and of themselves invent things, 
but rather are a key activity that takes part in turning the 
wheel of evolution. Furthermore, it is simplification that 
explains complexity: local simplification leads to a global 
increase in complexity.
Thus, while traditional theory is based on the idea that 
accidental mutation invents—where this supposed acci-
dental mutation is a remote, presumed event that cannot 
be seen or confirmed—the theory presented here is based 
on the empirically evident fact that preexisting elements 
come together into new, useful high-level interactions as 
the source of novelty in evolution. Note that it matters not 
whether the novelty involved in the transitions from the 
genes TRIM5 and CypA to their fusion, or from haphazard 
egg retrieval to backward walking, is small or great in and 
of itself. Rather, these transitions exemplify the steps that 
tie together the process of evolution, which in the long term 
has generated eyes, brains, etc.
We have a tendency to look for “foundations” from 
which everything else can be derived. In particular, it is 
convenient to assume that the causes of mutation are ran-
dom, because it puts an end to all of our questions. The 
philosophical move that is required from the perspective 
of interaction-based evolution is to let go of the notion that 
random mutation and novelty from a point are at the bot-
tom of things—that they provide a stable ground upward 
from which a conceptual edifice can be built; and to accept 
instead that the action is at the network level: that both the 
meaning and origin of genetic and phenotypic elements 
comes from the higher levels of organization—it comes 
from the network—from “above.” This move opens up the 
study of evolution substantially; because while the notion 
of random mutation means that there is nothing of impor-
tance to be studied about the causes of mutation from an 
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evolutionary perspective, the concept of non-accidental 
mutation provided by interaction-based evolution implies 
instead a whole world of biological mechanisms open to 
investigation.
Before Darwin, people used to think that different spe-
cies were each created separately in an instant. While Dar-
win made an immense contribution by showing that this 
is not the case, and that species are generated gradually, 
a notion of creation in an instant has been maintained in 
neo-Darwinism in other areas: the origin of life, the origin 
of mutations, and cooption. While Livnat (2013) argued 
among other things against the origin of life in an instant, 
this paper argues against the other two. Novelty arises not 
suddenly from a point but from gradual network-level evo-
lution. Indeed, if evolution according to random mutation 
and natural selection is a sequence of independent points, 
each representing a local accidental mutation disconnected 
from the rest, interaction-based evolution draws the lines 
between these points (see Livnat 2013) while fundamen-
tally altering their interpretation.
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